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Employment Law Case Update – October 2023

Employment Law

An interesting look at how not to exclude staff on maternity leave, how to properly handle transgender workers, calculating holiday pay where employees are subject to compulsory overtime and the use of contract clauses to retain employees where discretionary bonus payments are payable which do not amount to restraint of trade.

  • Sex Discrimination: Erosion of reputation as “an effective and useful member of staff” due to pregnancy is discriminatory
  • Sex Discrimination: ‘Deadnaming’ transgender worker amounts to less favourable treatment
  • Holiday Pay: Landmark case confirms a gap of three months or a correct payment does not necessarily break a series of deductions
  • Contract: Bonus clause conditional on staying in employment not restraint of trade

Sex Discrimination: Erosion of reputation as “an effective and useful member of staff” due to pregnancy is discriminatory

In Smith v Greatwell Homes (3316461/2021) a tribunal had to consider the employer’s actions and treatment of Ms Smith, following her declaration to her boss that she was pregnant. This case was reported in People Management on 13 October 2023:

Ms Smith began working at Greatwell Homes in March 2019 as a business improvement analyst within the business improvement team, where she was apparently a valuable and ambitious member of staff. The tribunal noted she was a “credible and consistent witness”. Within her team there were three members of staff: herself, a business improvement manager and a head of business intelligence. However, the person occupying the post of business improvement manager – the person who was meant to be Ms Smith’s line manager – had been absent from August 2019 due to long-term ill health. She never returned to work and resigned in early 2020. Consequently, Ms Smith was required to take on a “significant proportion” of the responsibilities that should have been her line manager’s.

The firm’s head of property services and compliance, Miss Herzig, viewed Ms Smith as a valuable member of the team and encouraged her to apply for a more senior post with line management responsibilities should one become available. In April 2020, Ms Smith informed Miss Herzig that she was pregnant. The tribunal found the news was not effectively communicated to human resources by Miss Herzig, and Ms Smith was required to confirm with HR that she was expecting a baby on two further occasions. “We find that this was symptomatic of the respondent’s attitude towards the claimant and/or to the fact she was pregnant,” it said. 

Ms Smith’s first claim arose during the same month. All staff were given a free day off by the company as a thank you for their efforts during the Covid pandemic. The day off was a Friday, however, when Ms Smith mentioned that she did not work Fridays, the firm refused to allow her to take a different day off. In September 2020, she went on maternity leave. Other than a few emails from HR about pension matters and some personal messages from Miss Herzig, Ms Smith did not hear from her employer during her maternity leave. 

Then in April 2021, Ms Smith received a text message from Miss Herzig in which she was informed that someone had been appointed as her new manager and the firm had also hired a Governance and Assurance Manager, which was only published internally on the company intranet. These were both roles, the tribunal ruled, that would have been opportunities for Ms Smith to progress within the company. The claimant was not happy about the text and what she perceived to be a lack of communication from the respondent during her maternity leave, which went against the company’s maternity policy – which stated that employees on maternity leave must be informed of job vacancies. She commenced a grievance which was heard by Mr Wilesmith, but it was not upheld. 

In August 2021, the respondent began to send job adverts to Ms Smith. This included a re-advertisement of the Governance and Assurance Manager’s post, as the current person occupying the role was on a 12-month contract and it would end in April 2022. The claimant resigned by letter dated 31 August. By a letter of the same day, the respondent accepted her resignation.

The tribunal held that Ms Smith was treated less favourably by the respondent on the grounds that she was on maternity leave, and commented that neither Miss Herzig nor Mr Wilesmith were impressive witnesses. It noted: “Neither demonstrated sufficient knowledge, skills or empathy in the way they dealt with the claimant throughout this process. It was the tribunal’s view that both were ill-equipped to deal with equality and diversity issues. It is incumbent on an employer to make sure that appropriately skilled and experienced staff deal with equality and diversity issues. The respondent had singularly failed in this regard.”

Regarding the free day off, the tribunal said the firm’s decision to not allow her to reschedule a day off was “unfavourable towards part-time workers, and therefore indirectly discriminatory towards female members of staff, as well as deeply unsympathetic in relation to the claimant herself”. It also ruled that Ms Smith “clearly [had] less favourable treatment” because she was on maternity leave as she was “barred from the opportunity” of participating in any recruitment process, or the chance to compete with other applicants to progress her career.

Employment judge Wood said: “In our view, it is clear that Miss Herzig’s view of [Smith] as an effective and useful member of staff had been eroded by the knowledge that she had become pregnant and was on maternity leave. It may have been, in part, a subconscious attitude. Nonetheless, we are clear that it was the reason, or a significant part of the reason, for the unfavourable treatment.” It also said the firm’s decision to send Smith job ads in August 2021 for vacancies that were expected to become available in April the following year were just “window dressing” to disguise the treatment that had gone before. Greatwell Homes was consequently ordered to pay Ms Smith £50,000.

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Sex Discrimination: ‘Deadnaming’ transgender worker amounts to less favourable treatment

In AB v Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames (ET/2303616/2021) the tribunal ruled that the Borough of Kingston Council had committed several acts of direct discrimination against its employee, Miss AB, because of her status as a transgender woman her while she was undergoing a gender transition by using her previous name. The Employment Tribunal upheld 10 of her claims and awarded her nearly £25,000 in damages.

The majority of the claims that succeeded were instances in which she was ‘deadnamed’—the term for referring to a trans person by the name, and therefore gender, that they used before they transitioned. The council used Miss AB’s deadname on her office door pass, her pension records, the staff directory, the internal complaints system and her parking pass, according to the judgment. All of these instances amounted to ‘less favourable treatment’ and were ‘because of the claimant’s protected characteristic’, the tribunal found. The tribunal also sided with Miss AB when she argued that management’s decision to remove some of her job responsibilities was an act of direct discrimination. ‘We conclude that [Miss AB’s manager] in taking this action was not simply acting unreasonably, but that the claimant’s protected characteristic was part of the reason for this treatment’, the tribunal ruled. ‘The claim therefore succeeds’.

The panel also found that management’s response to a complaint from Miss AB was direct discrimination because they failed to take the complaint seriously. It found that management ‘did not treat the claimant’s allegation with respect’ and demonstrated ‘a dismissive attitude towards the issue’. ‘We have to conclude that some part of his reaction was because of the claimant’s protected characteristic’, the panel ruled. Similarly, the tribunal held that a manager fell foul of discrimination law when he failed to properly escalate Miss AB’s complaint. ‘Again, we have to conclude that some part of his reaction and his lack of action was because of the claimant’s protected characteristic’, the panel said.

However, many of Miss AB’s claims failed because she filed them too late and did not give the judge a sufficient reason for her delay. Miss AB argued that her employer’s decision to cut off her direct contact with internal councillors was a discrete, rather than ongoing, act. However, the tribunal found that although the decision had ongoing consequences, it was a discrete act and it fell outside the tribunal’s time limits. The panel also found that a reprimand one of the managers gave Miss AB also took place too long before she filed her claim, but added that the claim would have failed in any event because the reprimand was a reasonable management response to her failing to obey an instruction.

The tribunal disagreed with Miss AB’s argument that the council’s failure to implement a health and safety risk assessment for gender transition was discrimination. There was no obligation to undertake such a risk assessment, the judgment said. The panel also found that the council did fail to have appropriate Equalities Act policies in place but said this ‘was not because of the claimant’s protected characteristic but because of HR failures on a wider scale’.

The tribunal awarded Miss AB £21,000 as compensation for injury to feelings plus £4,423 in interest.

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Holiday Pay: Landmark case confirms a gap of three months or a correct payment does not necessarily break a series of deductions

In Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland and another v Agnew and others [2023] UKSC 33 it was held that police officers and civilian staff in Northern Ireland are entitled to claim for underpayments of holiday pay going back many years following their employer’s failure to include overtime in its holiday pay calculations.

The Claimants were police officers and civilian staff working for the police in Northern Ireland. The case arose because they had historically only received basic pay for annual leave but the parties had agreed there had been an underpayment because the holiday pay should have included periods of compulsory overtime. The claimants brought claims for underpayment of holiday pay, and the question before the court was how far did this underpayment go back? The relevant Northern Irish legislation (mirroring the Employment Rights Act 1996) provided that a claim could only be made in respect of a payment made in the three months before the claim was brought. However, if the deduction was part of a series, the deductions could be linked together provided that the claim was brought within three months of the last of the series of deductions.

Previously, the EAT in Bear Scotland v Fulton had previously concluded that deductions could only be linked in a series if there was a gap of three months or less between each deduction but here the Supreme Court has now held that where a series of deductions are all based on an employer failing to properly meets its obligations to pay holiday correctly and, but for the mandatory cut off after 3 months which was set out in Bear Scotland, they would otherwise constitute a series, employees should be able to link each deduction. To hold otherwise would produce unfair consequences.

The Supreme Court held that:

(1) the EU principle of equivalence requires the police officers to be allowed the more advantageous series extension found in the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 even though they are not workers for the purposes of that legislation,

(2) the series extension is therefore read into the relevant part of the Working Time Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2016 to achieve this, and

(3) what constitutes a series of deductions is a question of fact which does not require a contiguous sequence and is not necessarily brought to an end by a gap of three months or a correct payment if that correct payment was calculated when the claimants were at work.

It further found that, (1) there is no legal requirement that leave derived from different sources must be taken in a particular order, (2) it is inappropriate to apply a general principle of using calendar days in the reference period when calculating a worker’s normal pay, and (3) the appropriate reference period when calculating normal pay in any case is a question of fact.

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Contract: Bonus clause conditional on staying in employment not restraint of trade

In Steel v Spencer Road LLP (trading as Omerta Steel) [2023] EWHC 2492 (Ch) the Chancery Division dismissed the appellant’s appeal from a decision which had dismissed his application to set aside a statutory demand served by the respondent. The appellant was a former employee of the respondent. Under the terms of his employment contract, his remuneration was by way of a basic annual salary plus a discretionary bonus scheme. The bonus was conditional on the appellant remaining in the employment of the respondent for three months from the date of payment of any bonus, and not having given or been given notice to terminate his appointment during that period.

In January 2022, the appellant was paid a bonus which was an amount considerably larger than his basic salary at the time. Later, he gave notice of termination of his employment in February. The respondent had requested repayment of the bonus under the clawback provisions in the employment contract. The appellant refused to do so and had argued that the bonus clawback provisions were unenforceable on the grounds that they were in restraint of trade and/or penalty clauses. The court held, among other things, that there was no doubt that an employee bonus or commission scheme which was conditional on the employee remaining in employment for a specified period of time operated as a disincentive to that employee resigning. That had not, however, turned such a provision into a restraint of trade.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com


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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.


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Employment Law Case Update – July 2022

Employment Law

This month we look at the saga of the ‘fire and rehire’ issue affecting Tesco employees and how whistleblowers can be fairly dismissed depending on their conduct. We also have two interesting cases about how direct discrimination can be viewed – the doctor who refused to address transgender people by their chosen pronouns who had not been discriminated against versus the feminist who expressed beliefs which could not be objected to (as core beliefs) even though they were capable of causing offence, and was discriminated against.

  • Fire and Rehire: Court of Appeal overturns injunction restraining termination and re-engagement of Tesco employees
  • Whistleblowing: Whistleblower’s dismissal not automatically unfair as decision-makers’ view of conduct when making protected disclosures separable from content or fact of disclosures
  • Direct Discrimination: EAT upholds tribunal decision that Christian doctor was not discriminated against for refusing to address transgender people by their chosen pronoun
  • Direct Discrimination: Gender critical feminist suffered direct discrimination for expressing her beliefs in a manner that was not “objectively offensive”

Fire and Rehire: Court of Appeal overturns injunction restraining termination and re-engagement of Tesco employees

In USDAW and others v Tesco Stores Ltd [2022] EWHC 201, the Court of Appeal has overturned the High Court’s injunction restraining Tesco from dismissing and re-engaging a group of warehouse operatives to remove a contractual pay enhancement known as “Retained Pay“. This had been incorporated through collective bargaining with the trade union USDAW as a retention incentive during a reorganisation. The collective agreement stated that the enhanced pay would be a “permanent feature” of each affected employee’s contractual entitlement, and could only be changed through mutual consent, or on promotion to a new role.  

The High Court had found that there was an implied term not to use termination and re-engagement as a means of removing Retained Pay. However, the Court of Appeal held that such an implied term was not justified. Neither could the employees rely on promissory estoppel since there had been no unequivocal promises related to termination. Furthermore, it was not “unconscionable” to remove a benefit that the employees had already received for over a decade and that far exceeded any redundancy payment to which they would have been entitled had they not accepted the Retained Pay.

In any event, even if there had been a breach, the court held that the injunction was not justified. The court was not aware of any previous cases in which a final injunction had been granted to prevent a private sector employer from dismissing an employee for an indefinite period. Moreover, the terms of the injunction had not been sufficiently clear.  

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Whistleblowing: Whistleblower’s dismissal not automatically unfair as decision-makers’ view of conduct when making protected disclosures separable from content or fact of disclosures

In Kong v Gulf International Bank (UK) Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 941, the Court of Appeal has upheld the EAT’s decision that an employment tribunal directed itself properly on the issue of the separability of the protected disclosures made by an employee and the reason in the minds of the decision-makers for her dismissal. The tribunal had properly considered and applied the guidance on the issue set out in authorities such as Martin v Devonshire Solicitors UKEAT/0086/10 and NHS Manchester v Fecitt and others [2012] IRLR 64. Despite the fact that the tribunal had found that the employee’s conduct when making the protected disclosures had been broadly reasonable and she had not, as alleged, questioned her colleague’s professional integrity, her dismissal was not automatically unfair because the decision-makers believed that she had acted unreasonably. The reason for dismissal in the minds of the decision-makers could be properly separable from the fact of the protected disclosures being made. The court rejected the submissions of Protect as intervenor that an employee’s conduct in making a disclosure should only be properly considered separable from the making of a protected disclosure where that conduct constitutes wholly unreasonable behaviour or serious misconduct.  

This decision makes it clear that even where a worker’s conduct is not objectively unreasonable when they make a protected disclosure, their employer may escape liability when it treats them detrimentally or dismisses them because it subjectively believes that the manner in which they made the disclosures was unreasonable. However, the court stressed that particularly close scrutiny of an employer’s reasons for treating them detrimentally would be needed in such a case to ensure that the real reason for adverse treatment was not the protected disclosure itself.  

It is understood that the employee is considering an appeal to the Supreme Court.  

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Direct Discrimination: EAT upholds tribunal decision that Christian doctor was not discriminated against for refusing to address transgender people by their chosen pronoun

In Mackereth v DWP [2022] EAT 99, the EAT has held that a tribunal did not err in dismissing a Christian doctor’s claims of direct discrimination, indirect discrimination and harassment on grounds of religion or belief because of his refusal to address transgender service users by their chosen pronouns. He relied on his particular beliefs in the supremacy of Genesis 1:27 that a person cannot change their sex/gender at will, his lack of belief in what he described as “transgenderism” and his conscientious objection to “transgenderism“. However, Eady P, sitting with lay members, found that the tribunal had erred in several respects when applying the criteria from Grainger Plc v Nicholson UKEAT/0219/09 to determine whether these beliefs were capable of protection under section 4 of the Equality Act 2010. In particular, the tribunal had erred in holding that the beliefs were not worthy of respect in a democratic society. This threshold must be set at a low level so as to allow for the protection not just of beliefs acceptable to the majority, but also of minority beliefs that might cause offence (approving Forstater v CGD Europe UKEAT/0105/20).  

The tribunal had been entitled to find in the alternative that the direct discrimination and harassment claims were not made out. It was permissible to draw a distinction between Dr Mackereth’s beliefs and the way he manifested them, finding that any employee not prepared to utilise a service user’s chosen pronoun would have been treated the same way.  

The tribunal had also been entitled to reject the indirect discrimination claim. In holding that the PCPs were necessary and proportionate, it carefully considered the lack of practical alternatives to face-to-face contact with service users. In noting that Dr Mackereth had not identified any further alternatives, over and above those considered and discounted by his employer, this did not amount to the imposition of the burden of proof on him.

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Direct Discrimination: Gender critical feminist suffered direct discrimination for expressing her beliefs in a manner that was not “objectively offensive”

In Forstater v CGD Europe and others ET/22200909/2019, an employment tribunal has upheld a claim of direct discrimination on ground of belief, where an individual’s contract was not renewed because she had expressed gender critical beliefs which some colleagues found offensive. This follows an earlier EAT judgment in which her gender critical beliefs had been held to be protected as a philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010. They included the belief that a person’s sex is an immutable biological fact, not a feeling or an identity, and that a trans woman is not in reality a woman. The claimant had described a prominent gender-fluid individual as a “part-time cross dresser” and a “man in heels” who should not have accepted an accolade intended for female executives. She had also left a gender critical campaign booklet in the office (which she later apologised for) and posted a campaign video on twitter containing ominous music and imagery, which argued that gender self-ID put women and girls at greater risk.

The respondents argued that it was the way in which the claimant had expressed her beliefs, and not the fact that she held them, that had been the reason for non-renewal. The tribunal held, following earlier case law, that the way in which a belief is manifested is only dissociable from the belief itself where it is done in a manner which is inappropriate or to which objection can reasonably be taken, bearing in mind an individual’s qualified right to manifest their belief under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In this case, the claimant’s tweets and other communications were little more than an assertion of the core protected belief (which could not be objected to even though it was capable of causing offence). In some cases the claimant had been provocative or mocking but this was the “common currency of debate” and was not objectively offensive or unreasonable.

The claimant had also been victimised when her profile was taken off the respondent’s website after she talked to The Sunday Times about her discrimination case. However, her claims of indirect discrimination and harassment were dismissed.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com


Back

The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.


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