A range of decisions from across the spectrum of employment jurisdiction this month as we take a look at some of the most recent cases. A tribunal determined that a consultant contracted through a service company was a worker, making deductions for employer NICs unlawful. The EAT overturned a re-engagement order for an unfairly dismissed employee due to errors in assessing contributory conduct and the issue of the employer’s lost trust. The EAT also found that a tribunal failed to address key issues in a race discrimination claim where an employee alleged her job re-evaluation requests were mishandled due to her ethnicity. And the Court of Appeal upheld that a tribunal erred in determining the timing of a discrimination claim where it was based on delayed knowledge of key facts.
- Workers: Consultant engaged by recruitment agency via service company was a worker
- Remedies: EAT declared tribunal erred in ordering re-engagement of employee
- List of Issues: Tribunal erred in failing to address race discrimination allegation not pleaded but included in list of issues
- Discrimination: Tribunal erred in determining claimant’s date of knowledge of claims
Workers: Consultant engaged by recruitment agency via service company was a worker
In Appiah v Tripod Partners Ltd ET/2302929/202, an employment tribunal has found that a consultant who contracted with a recruitment agency through a service company was a worker of the agency under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996).
Ms Appiah was an independent social worker. Tripod Partners Ltd, a social care recruitment agency, placed her on an assignment to the Home Office. The Home Office assessed Ms Appiah using HMRC’s CEST tool. It decided she fell inside IR35 and should therefore be taxed as an employee.
Ms Appiah had previously contracted with Tripod through an umbrella company. However, following the Home Office assessment, Tripod gave her the additional options of an arrangement within PAYE or of contracting via a service company. Tripod explained that there were “small differences” in these options. It also confirmed that if she opted for a service company, it would deduct income tax and employee national insurance contributions (NICs) from her hourly pay. She decided to contract via a service company.
Once the contract had been finalised, Tripod made deductions from Ms Appiah’s pay for income tax, employee NICs and employer NICs. Ms Appiah accepted that Tripod was entitled to make deductions for income tax and employee NICs. However, she brought a claim alleging that the deductions for employer NICs were unlawful under the ERA 1996. Tripod argued that Ms Appiah was not a worker, so could not bring a claim for unlawful deductions.
The tribunal noted that the relevant contract was between two limited companies. However, this was not determinative. The efficacy of statutory protections would be eroded if everyone working through a service company was excluded from the rights afforded by ERA 1996.
It was evident that Ms Appiah was a worker. She sent timesheets to Tripod, not invoices. The contract said she was not a worker, but this did not reflect the reality. She worked full-time on her assignment, performing services personally. There was no difference in substance between the contractual arrangements she had been offered; they were simply different ways in which her payment could be channelled to her. She was not in business on her own account and neither the Home Office nor Tripod were her client. There was no route by which the contractual arrangement could genuinely be said to be between two businesses.
The tribunal went on to uphold Ms Appiah’s claim for unlawful deductions from wages in respect of Tripod’s deductions for employer NICs.
Remedies: EAT declared tribunal erred in ordering re-engagement of employee
In British Council v Sellers [2025] EAT 1, the EAT has held that a tribunal erred in ordering the re-engagement of an employee who had been unfairly dismissed following an allegation of sexual misconduct.
Before ordering re-engagement, a tribunal must consider the employee’s wishes, whether it is practicable for the employer to comply with a re-engagement order and, where the employee caused or contributed to their dismissal, whether ordering re-engagement would be just (section 116(3), Employment Rights Act 1996).
In this case, the tribunal found that, while the relevant decision-taker genuinely believed the employee had committed the alleged misconduct, their belief was unreasonably derived from a flawed investigation which the appeal process had failed to rectify. Following this decision, but before the remedy hearing, the employer instructed an independent investigator to undertake a fresh investigation. The investigator concluded that the accuser had been truthful. The employer upheld its gross misconduct finding.
At the remedy hearing, the employer did not argue that the employee had caused or contributed to his dismissal. Instead, it argued that its genuine and rational concerns about his conduct made it impracticable to re-employ him. The tribunal considered itself bound to address the issue of contributory conduct and found that, on the balance of probabilities, the alleged sexual assault did not occur. It held that it was irrational for the employer to have concerns about the employee’s conduct based on the independent investigation which it considered to be flawed in several respects. The tribunal ordered re-engagement. The employer appealed.
The EAT held that the tribunal erred in determining whether the employee had committed the alleged misconduct. Section 116(3) does not mandate the tribunal to make a finding on contributory conduct. Only where the tribunal has made such a finding (at the liability stage or because it was raised on remedy) would it need to consider whether it would be just to order re-engagement.
The tribunal had also erred by losing sight of the fact that practicability had to be determined from the employer’s perspective. It had considered the reasonableness of the independent investigation when it should have considered whether re-engaging the employee was likely to be practicable in circumstances in which the employer had accepted the investigation’s finding that he had committed a sexual assault and considered that he could no longer be trusted. The re-engagement order was set aside.
List of Issues: Tribunal erred in failing to address race discrimination allegation not pleaded but included in list of issues
In Bogdan v The Cabinet Office: Government Digital Services [2024] EAT 177, the EAT has allowed an appeal where an employment tribunal either failed to address, or failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting, a direct race discrimination claim in which the claimant, Ms Bogdan, alleged that her requests to re-evaluate her job grade were not adequately addressed by her employer, and this was less favourable treatment because she is a Romany Gypsy.
Ms Bogdan was a litigant in person when she issued her claim. In the claim form, there was no hint of any suggestion that she had made several job re-evaluation requests or been subjected to race discrimination by having such requests ignored, mishandled or refused. However, an employment judge subsequently conducted case management, which resulted in a list of issues. This stated that the allegation of direct race discrimination included that, from the beginning of her employment, she had made several job re-evaluation requests to her line manager. The thrust of her case, as set out in the list of issues, was that her employer had failed to deal with those requests, which had left her job wrongly graded.
An employment tribunal dismissed all of Ms Bogdan’s claims. She appealed on the basis that the tribunal failed to adequately deal with her direct race discrimination claim, as there was material evidence to which no reference was made and about which no adequate reasons appeared in the judgment.
The EAT allowed part of the appeal relating to the issues contained in the list of issues concerning her repeated job re-evaluation requests. It concluded that the list of issues effectively operated as substantial amendments to the originally pleaded claims in a way that neither Ms Bogdan’s employer nor the employment tribunal had fully appreciated. Despite the fact that her case, as presented at the tribunal, was not her pleaded case, the EAT concluded that the issues contained in the list of issues were squarely before the tribunal, yet it had fundamentally omitted to deal with them. It was therefore not apparent from its reasoning why she was not successful on those issues. This was a serious procedural irregularity, and the EAT remitted those issues to a new tribunal.
The case is a reminder of the importance of the parties and the tribunal being alive to the issues contained in the list of issues and ensuring that these are adequately dealt with in the reasons contained in the tribunal’s judgment.
Discrimination: Tribunal erred in determining claimant’s date of knowledge of claims
In HSBC Bank plc v Chavalier-Firescu [2024] EWCA Civ 155, the Court of Appeal has upheld the EAT’s decision that a tribunal erred in determining the date on which a claimant had sufficient knowledge to bring her discrimination claims.
In July 2018, the claimant learned that her application to join HSBC Bank plc had been unsuccessful and that someone from her previous employer, Barclays, had given her a bad reference. She had ongoing sex discrimination proceedings against Barclays at that time, but only suspected that this was the reason for the bad reference. However, in August and September 2020, information disclosed following her data subject access request led the claimant to believe that she had been considered a very strong candidate by HSBC, but that a senior manager, on learning of her sex discrimination claim against Barclays, had provided negative feedback to her interviewer, leading to HSBC’s decision not to hire her.
The claimant presented claims against HSBC in November 2020 and May 2021. A tribunal struck out the claims, holding that they were presented out of time as the decision not to appoint her was made in July 2018, there was no continuing act, and it was not just and equitable to extend time.
The court held that the EAT had correctly found that the tribunal had erred in striking out the claims. It had failed to explain its reasoning that the claimant was fully aware of the elements of her claim in July 2018 or show that it had taken proper account of the fact that she had only learned information to support her claims in 2020.
Underhill LJ held that where, as in this case, a claimant seeks an extension of time on the basis that they were unaware of important facts material to the viability of their claim, it is necessary for the tribunal to consider the extent of their knowledge, or grounds for suspicion, at the relevant time to assess what justice and equity require. Following Barnes v Metropolitan Police Commissioner UKEAT/0474/05, it will also be relevant to consider whether they should have known or suspected and, if they did, whether it was nevertheless reasonable for them to delay issuing proceedings. The claims were remitted to a different tribunal to consider whether it would be just and equitable to extend time.
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