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Employment Law Case Update – December 2024

  • Anne-Marie Pavitt,

  • 17th December 2024

Employment Law

In our last update of the year we bring you technical tribunal processes about not including additional claims at tribunal, how to interpret the Equality Act in relation to the definition of “related to” and how to properly assess value in an assessment of injury to feelings.

  • Tribunals: Employment tribunal entitled to refuse amendment where claimant had made informed decision not to include additional claims in ET1
  • Race Discrimination: Comments about employee’s accent could be “related to” race for harassment purposes, even if not motivated by race
  • Sexual Discrimination: Tribunal’s assessment of injury to feelings in pregnancy discrimination case was “totally flawed”

Tribunals: Employment tribunal entitled to refuse amendment where claimant had made informed decision not to include additional claims in ET1

In Vassallo v Mizuho International plc and another [2024] EAT 170, the EAT held that an employment tribunal had been entitled to refuse a claimant’s application to amend her claim to add a whistleblowing complaint and an indirect sex discrimination complaint. The claimant had been legally represented and there was evidence she had taken a conscious decision not to include those claims in the original ET1.

The EAT has held that an employment tribunal had been entitled to refuse a claimant’s application to amend her claim to add whistleblowing claims and an indirect sex discrimination claim, because the tribunal had been entitled to conclude that she had been legally advised and had made an informed choice not to put them in her ET1.

The claimant’s ET1, which had been drafted by solicitors and submitted in March 2023, contained complaints of breach of contract and disability discrimination. Her solicitors then came off the record. In August 2023, the claimant, having instructed new solicitors, applied to amend her claim to add complaints of detriment and automatic unfair dismissal arising from protected disclosures (the whistleblowing claims) and indirect sex discrimination. The tribunal refused the application to amend, and later declined to reconsider that refusal. It found that no good reasons had been given as to why the claims were not included in the ET1, or for the delay in applying to amend. It noted that the claimant had been legally represented, and it was clear from email correspondence in the hearing bundle that her former solicitors had prepared an earlier draft ET1 containing the whistleblowing claims, but the final ET1 had not included them. The tribunal concluded an informed decision had been taken not to include those claims. The balance of injustice was also in favour of the respondents.

The claimant appealed, arguing that the tribunal had made findings of fact not supported by evidence and/or based on erroneous assumptions. She also argued that she had been badly advised and did not know she had a potential whistleblowing claim.

The EAT refused the appeal. The tribunal had heard evidence and submissions from both parties and had been entitled to conclude that careful thought had been given to the drafting of the ET1. The tribunal did not have to adopt an inquisitorial role in relation to the claimant’s state of knowledge; it was up to the claimant what evidence to introduce and whether to waive privilege in her former solicitors’ advice. Furthermore, it did not matter whether it was the claimant or her former solicitors who made the decision not to include the additional claims in the ET1, since the claimant bore ultimate responsibility for her solicitors’ actions.

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Race Discrimination: Comments about employee’s accent could be “related to” race for harassment purposes, even if not motivated by race

In Carozzi v University of Hertfordshire and another [2024] EAT 169, the EAT held that an employment tribunal was wrong to find that comments about an employee’s accent were not harassment under the Equality Act 2010 because they were not motivated by her race. Such comments could nevertheless be “related to” race.

Ms Carozzi, a Brazilian national of Jewish ethnic origin, was employed by the University of Hertfordshire. She resigned before completing her probationary period (which had twice been extended). She brought a number of employment tribunal claims, including for race-related harassment and victimisation. Her harassment claim centred on comments that had been made about her accent. Her victimisation claim alleged that the University’s HR representative, Ms Withers, had refused to share with her the notes of a meeting, because she might then use them against the University in a race discrimination claim.

The tribunal dismissed her claims. It found that the comments about Ms Carozzi’s accent had not been motivated by her race. Rather, they had been about her intelligibility or comprehensibility when communicating.

As for the victimisation claim, the tribunal found that Ms Withers had decided against providing the meeting notes knowing that they might give Ms Carozzi “ammunition” for an employment tribunal claim. However, Ms Withers would have done the same with any other employee who had indicated an intention to make an employment tribunal claim, such as constructive dismissal, that was not based on the EqA 2010. In any event, it did not consider that the treatment could be detrimental, based on Khan and Derbyshire. Ms Carozzi appealed to the EAT.

The EAT allowed the appeal and remitted the harassment and victimisation claims to a fresh tribunal. The EAT observed that there are a number of components in a complaint of harassment, one of which is that the harassment must be “related to” a protected characteristic such as race. In its view, the tribunal had erred in its approach to that component.

The tribunal had stated that a mental element is required in a claim of harassment as much as in a claim of direct discrimination. However, the EAT held that this was wrong. The tribunal had placed considerable emphasis on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Nailard. The issue in that case had been whether the employer’s failure to investigate a grievance alleging sex discrimination was itself related to sex, and therefore an act of harassment. Nailard had not been about harassment in the more typical circumstances in which a complaint is made about words spoken to, or behaviour towards, an individual, and whether that conduct is related to a protected characteristic.

The EAT held that there is no requirement in a harassment claim for a “mental element” equivalent to that in a claim of direct discrimination. Treatment may be “related to” a protected characteristic where it is “because of” the protected characteristic, but that is not the only way conduct can be related to a protected characteristic. There may be circumstances in which harassment occurs where the protected characteristic did not motivate the harasser. The EAT gave the further example of a person who unknowingly uses a word that is offensive to people who have a relevant protected characteristic because it is historically linked to oppression of people with that characteristic. The fact that the person using the word did not know that it had such a connotation would not prevent the word being related to the protected characteristic. The use of the word could therefore potentially amount to harassment, applying the factors in section 26(4) of the EqA 2010, notably the perception of the complainant and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have the effect of violating their dignity.

The EAT went on to observe that an accent may be an important part of a person’s national or ethnic identity. Comments about a person’s accent could be related to the protected characteristic of race. Criticism of such an accent could violate dignity. Obviously, that did not mean that any mention of a person’s accent will amount to harassment. The tribunal would have to consider whether the comment about an accent in a particular case was unwanted and related to race, as well as considering the other elements of section 26.

The EAT held that the tribunal had asked itself the wrong question to establish the reason for the refusal to supply the meeting notes. It should not have asked whether a person who might have brought a different type of claim (that did not amount to a protected act under the EqA 2010) would have been treated differently. The correct question for the employment tribunal was whether the decision not to provide the meeting notes was to a material degree influenced by the fact that Ms Carozzi had made or might make a complaint of unlawful discrimination.

It noted that the EqA 2010 definition of victimisation no longer requires a comparison to be made with the treatment of others. Regarding detriment, the House of Lords in Khan had held that an employer may take reasonable steps to protect its position in discrimination proceedings without this being considered unlawful victimisation. This had led the tribunal in the instant case to conclude that there had been no detriment. However, the tribunal in this case had not considered whether the parties thought that there were likely to be employment tribunal proceedings. Specifically, it had not considered whether an employee who brings a grievance, that might resolve the issue without the need for tribunal proceedings, might reasonably consider themselves disadvantaged by not being provided with the notes of a meeting. Accordingly, the EAT allowed the appeal on this point.

This case confirms that the “related to” test in the definition of harassment is wider than the “because of” test (sometimes referred to in case law as the “reason why” test) that applies to direct discrimination. Conduct can be related to a protected characteristic either where it is motivated by the protected characteristic, or where, regardless of the conscious or unconscious motivations of the alleged harasser, there is objectively some relationship between the conduct or language used and a protected characteristic. Sexist jokes and racial epithets are obvious examples, but the unwitting use of, for example, homophobic, transphobic or ableist language may also, depending on the circumstances (particularly the reasonableness test), be capable of meeting the definition of harassment.

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Sexual Discrimination: Tribunal’s assessment of injury to feelings in pregnancy discrimination case was “totally flawed”

In Shakil v Samsons Limited [2024] EAT 192, the Claimant had only been working for the Respondent for about six months when she called in sick with ‘morning sickness’. In response and without notice, the Respondent reduced the Claimant’s hours of work  criticising her capability and conduct. It then placed her at risk of redundancy, ultimately dismissing her, one month before she was due to start maternity leave.

Unsurprisingly, the Claimant took a claim of pregnancy discrimination to the tribunal who agreed with her. It was clear to the tribunal that the Respondent’s actions were due to the Claimant’s pregnancy-related illness and that the redundancy had been invented to deal with the Claimant’s pregnancy. In making the award, however, the tribunal simply made an injury to feelings award of £5,000 without any reference to ‘Vento bands ’ or where the Claimant’s injury fell within those bands. The Claimant appealed the award.

The EAT found this assessment to be “totally flawed” and allowed the appeal on the basis that the tribunal had failed to apply the Vento guidelines at all. In particular, the tribunal did not:

  • identify the detailed evidence given by the Claimant in her witness statement about the injury to feeling she suffered as a result of the discrimination;
  • make any findings of fact about the injury to feelings suffered;
  • refer to Vento at all;
  • refer to any statutory provision or authority relevant to assessing injury to feeling;
  • identify the relevant bands for this claim in Presidential Guidance;
  • state which band the injury to feelings fell within;
  • explain why the award was set as it was within the band.

The EAT remitted the matter of remedy to a fresh tribunal rather than impose an alternative injury to feelings award itself.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – February 2024

  • Employment,

  • 26th February 2024

Employment Law

In this issue, we delve into recent legal cases that shed light on critical aspects of employment law looking at the treatment of a gender-critical professor over their research, the intricacies of whistleblowing as it may or may not affect job applicants, an examination of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) regulations (TUPE),  and the delicate balance between anonymity and justice in relation to fabricated sexual assault allegations.

  • Discrimination & Harassment: Gender-critical professor was discriminated against for research
  • Whistleblowing: Job applicants are not entitled to bring claims when they have suffered detriment because of making a protected disclosure
  • TUPE: Liability for harassment claim does not transfer if both employees do not transfer
  • Anonymity: Claimant who made up sexual assault was not entitled to privacy orders

Discrimination & Harassment: Gender-critical professor was discriminated against for research

In Phoenix v The Open University (3322700/2021 & 3323841/2021), a gender-critical professor has persuaded an employment tribunal that her employer university harassed and discriminated against her based on her views before unfairly pushing her to resign.

At the tribunal, the Employment Judge Young ruled that Open University professors led a ‘call to discriminate’ against Professor Jo Phoenix by releasing an open letter protesting against her gender-critical research network. The discriminatory letter led to a ‘pile-on’ against Phoenix, Judge Young said. The judge said that the university failed to provide a suitable working environment for Phoenix by leaving her exposed to the backlash, which amounted to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence in her contract and ultimately led her to resign. She found that The Open University did not protect Phoenix from the ‘negative campaign’ against her after she launched her research network because it ‘did not want to be seen to give any kind of support to academics with gender critical beliefs’, the judge said.

The university employed Phoenix as a professor from 2016 until she resigned in December 2021 following what she described as an ‘exceptionally painful’ part of her career amid widespread opposition to her views. Equality laws protect Phoenix’s belief (a position often referred to as gender-critical) which holds a person cannot change their biological sex and that sex cannot be conflated with gender identity, according to the 155-page ruling.

Phoenix ran a research network at the university that examined sex, gender and sexuality from a gender-critical perspective, according to the ruling. But the network met significant opposition from her colleagues, the judgment says. Criminology professor Louise Westmarland harassed Phoenix by comparing her views to those of ‘a racist uncle at the Christmas table’, the judge said. ‘Westmarland knew that likening [Phoenix] to a racist was upsetting’, Judge Young said. ‘We conclude that its purpose was to violate [Phoenix’s] dignity because, inherent in the comment, is an insult of being put in the same category as racists.’

Her colleagues also discriminated against her when they ‘gave her the silent treatment’ during a departmental meeting in response to Phoenix securing a grant of CAN$1m grant for research into transgender prisoners. Criminology lecturer Deborah Drake also discriminated against Phoenix by instructing her not to speak to the rest of the department about her research, about Essex University’s decision to cancel her talk on trans rights and imprisonment and about accusations of being a ‘transphobe’ that she was facing, Judge Young said. ‘Others were allowed to speak about their research in subsequent meetings…and research updates were part of the agenda for departmental meetings’, the judge said.

A series of tweets and retweets by Open University staff referring to Phoenix as transphobic also insulted her and discriminated against her, according to the judgment. The university also continued to harass Phoenix after her resignation by publishing further statements on its website condemning her research, Judge Young said.

‘I am delighted that the tribunal found in my favour’, Phoenix said in a statement. ‘Academics and universities must now, surely, recognise their responsibilities toward promoting diversity of viewpoints and tolerance of alternative views.’ Leigh Day partner Annie Powell, who represented Phoenix, added that she hopes to see ‘no further cases of academics being treated so badly because of their protected beliefs’.

Professor Tim Blackman, vice-chancellor of the Open University, said, ‘Our priority has been to protect freedom of speech while respecting legal rights and protections. We are disappointed by the judgment and will need time to consider it in detail, including our right to appeal.’

The Employment Appeal Tribunal overturned in 2021 a ruling by a lower tribunal that gender-critical views are not a protected belief. It held that the opinions held by a woman who lost her job after she published comments about transgender people online were legally protected. Ms Forstater was subsequently awarded over £106,000 by the employment tribunal. The employment tribunal ruled in a different case in May 2023 that the Open University did not discriminate against a member of staff that it sacked for sending a racist tweet to Star Wars actor John Boyega.

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Whistleblowing: Job applicants are not entitled to bring claims when they have suffered detriment because of making a protected disclosure

The EAT in Sullivan v Isle of Wight Council [2024] EAT 3 confirmed the position that whistleblowing detriment claims are confined to workers (as defined) and do not extend to job applicants, except in the case of applicants for jobs with certain specified NHS employers under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (NHS Recruitment—Protected Disclosure) Regulations 2018. It confirms that using a Gilham style argument, applying the right to freedom from discrimination under Article 14, read with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10, of the European Convention on Human Rights, to extend the reach of such claims to job applicants, will not succeed, in particular because being a job applicant is not some ‘other status’ for the purpose of Article 14.

All workers have the right to bring a claim in relation to any detriment suffered because of any act or omission by their employer, done on the ground that the complainant made a protected disclosure. ‘Worker’ in this context has an extended definition. The protection applies to workers (as defined). Job applicants are generally not covered. However, certain NHS employers are prohibited from discriminating against job applicants because it appears that they have made a protected disclosure.

In Gilham, a whistleblowing detriment claim under Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘the Act’), the Supreme Court held that the claimant, a district judge, was not a worker for the purposes of the Act (because she had no contract) but held that judicial-office-holders were nonetheless entitled to bring claims for whistleblowing protection under the Act because the exclusion of judges was in breach of their right to freedom from discrimination under Article 14, read with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10, of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Supreme Court concluded that the Act should therefore be read and given effect so as to extend their whistleblowing protection to the holders of judicial office.

The claimant in this case had two unsuccessful applications for financial officer roles with the respondent. She then lodged complaints alleging that multiple inappropriate/discriminatory comments had been made during her interviews including that she had been called ‘mentally insane’. Her complaints were rejected and she was refused an appeal. Later she lodged claims for discrimination, victimisation and whistleblowing detriment. The detriment claim related to the refusal to allow her an appeal which she said was because of an allegation of financial mismanagement that she had made against one of the interviewers in relation to a charity with which he was involved. She alleged that even though the whistleblowing provisions only applied to workers (which she was not) they should be extended to job applicants, such as her, using Articles 10 and 14 of the ECHR.

The employment tribunal dismissed the whistleblowing detriment claim and the claimant appealed. The EAT upheld part of the tribunal’s decisions but also dismissed the appeal on the basis that:

  1. Whilst the facts fell within the ambit of the right to freedom of expression protected by Article 10 ECHR, it was only applicable subject to the following conditions.
  2. An external job applicant is not in a situation analogous to that of the internal applicant, who is already embedded in the workplace and whose disclosure is made in that context. It was also accepted that this particular claimant’s situation was not analogous to that of an internal applicant. Her application process had come to an end some months previously. Her subsequent disclosure had related to matters unconnected with the application made, or, indeed, with the respondent itself, and had been advanced under a complaints policy of which any member of the public was able to avail themself in relation to any perceived wrongdoing by the respondent. The NHS Regulations were not applicable here.
  3. The claimant had relied on the status of an external job applicant as the ‘other status’ for the purposes of Article 14 ECHR. However, that was found not to be of the same quality as the occupational classification (judicial officeholder) as in the precedent case. The claimant did not possess or acquire a status, or occupational classification, independent of her act of applying for a job.
  4. Whilst the EAT found the employment tribunal’s approach to the question of proportionality was problematic, in the absence of any evidence going to that matter and the structured approach to answering that question required by the precedent case, it was not relevant here due to the above three issues. Had the answers to the those questions been otherwise, the matter would have been remitted for fresh consideration of that particular question.

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TUPE: Liability for harassment claim does not transfer if both employees do not transfer

In Sean Pong Tyres Ltd v Moore [2024] EAT 1 the EAT found that the transferor employer’s primary liability to its employee for the harassment did not transfer to the transferee employer under TUPE where the employee’s employment did not transfer to the new employer for reasons that were not connected with it (e.g. as in this case where the employee’s employment came to an end before the transfer for unrelated reasons).

In this case, the claimant resigned in April 2021 and claimed unfair constructive dismissal and harassment based on the actions of a fellow employee, Mr Owusu. In July 2021, after the claimant had left, there was a TUPE transfer of the respondent business, including Mr Owusu, to Credential. Neither Mr Owusu nor Credential were made respondents to the claim. The claim was only brought against the respondent by whom the claimant had been employed. When the hearing began the respondent’s representative applied to amend the response to argue that the respondent was not liable for the harassment, on the basis that liability for that had transferred to Credential under TUPE 2006.

The employment tribunal dismissed the respondent’s amendment application on the basis that the effect of TUPE 2006 was not to transfer liability for harassment to Credential in respect of the claimant who they had never employed and that, following the Selkent principles, on the facts, the balance of prejudice was in favour of the claimant.

The employment tribunal then upheld the claims of unfair constructive dismissal and harassment. The respondent appealed to the EAT who dismissed the appeal, finding that the transferor employer’s primary liability to its employee for the harassment does not transfer to the transferee employer if the employee’s employment does not transfer for reasons that were not connected with it (e.g. as in this case where the employee’s employment came to an end before the transfer for unrelated reasons).

This should come as a relief to transferees who might otherwise have found themselves liable for Equality Act 2010 claims by individuals who they had never employed (although it is likely that such liability could have been dealt with by suitable warranties/indemnities in a transfer agreement).

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Anonymity: Claimant who made up sexual assault was not entitled to privacy orders

In Z v Commerzbank and others [2024] EAT 11, a claimant who was found by an employment tribunal to have made up a sexual assault allegation, and who had made no such allegation to the police (or other appropriate person), was not entitled to continued protection under anonymity and restricted reporting orders that an employment judge had made. For a claimant to have the protection of section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 (SO(A)A 1992) there must be a formal allegation made in the context of potential criminal proceedings, where a criminal charge may be brought (such as a complaint to the police, a prosecuting authority, a safeguarding body, a social worker or social services department or other person with professional responsibility for taking the complaint further through the criminal justice system). In addition, the tribunal’s decision, that the claimant’s account given in his evidence was in large part false and, in particular, that his complaints of sexual harassment and sexual assault were fabricated, was a material change of circumstances entitling the tribunal to revoke the anonymity and restricted reporting orders. Also, the tribunal’s balancing exercise in relation to Convention rights was not flawed, according to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – June 2023

  • Employment,

  • 27th June 2023

Employment Law

This month we look at several aspects of the Equality Act through the lens of religious discrimination, race discrimination and harassment. We also take a look at how one should properly calculate holiday pay so as not to fall foul of the Working Time Regulations.

  • Religious Discrimination: EAT remits Facebook posts case and sets out principles underpinning proportionality assessment
  • Race Discrimination: Judgment against qualifications body held not to be Meek-compliant
  • Harassment: Claimant must be aware of the unwanted conduct in order for it to amount to harassment
  • Holiday Pay: How to calculate holiday pay on termination of employment

 

Religious Discrimination: EAT remits Facebook posts case and sets out principles underpinning proportionality assessment

In Higgs v Farmor’s School [2023] EAT 89, the EAT held that in dismissing a direct religion or belief discrimination claim brought by a Christian employee following complaints relating to her social media posts which criticised the nature of sex education in schools (including gender fluidity and same sex marriage) the employment tribunal had erred in that it failed to:

  • conclude that there was a close or direct nexus between the employee’s Facebook posts and her protected beliefs
  • determine the reason why the employer acted as it had, and
  • assess whether the employer’s actions were prescribed by law and necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others

The proportionality assessment, which the tribunal had not carried out, was necessary to determine whether the employer’s actions were because of, or related to, the manifestation of the employee’s protected beliefs, or were in fact due to a justified objection to the manner of that manifestation.

The EAT also set out basic principles that underpin the approach adopted when assessing proportionality of any interference with rights to freedom of religion and freedom of expression to assist tribunals and to better inform employers and employees as to where they stand on issues arising from the manifestation of religious or other philosophical beliefs.

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Race Discrimination: Judgment against qualifications body held not to be Meek-compliant

The case of General Medical Council v Karim [2023] EAT 87 concerned a claimant doctor who was subject to an investigation by his employer. That led to a referral to the General Medical Council (GMC). The employment side of things was settled when he resigned and a settlement agreement was entered into. However the GMC matter continued. The claimant then made a claim of discrimination by the GMC as a qualifications body, making various complaints in relation to its handling of the matter.

The employment tribunal upheld some (but not all) of the complaints of direct race discrimination on the basis that the burden of proof had passed but not been satisfied.

The GMC appealed to the EAT.

Allowing the GMC’s appeal, the EAT held, in summary, that the tribunal had failed to engage with key aspects of its case, and so produced a decision which was not Meek-compliant; and reached some findings and conclusions at different points that were conflicting or contradictory.

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Harassment: Claimant must be aware of the unwanted conduct in order for it to amount to harassment

In Greasley-Adams v Royal Mail Group Ltd [2023] EAT 86 the EAT had to consider (amongst other grounds of appeal) whether an employment tribunal had failed in its analysis of the claimant’s claims of harassment under section 26 of the Equality Act 2020 by not having regard to conduct of which he was not aware.

The EAT, dismissing the appeal, held that only conduct of which the claimant was aware could amount to harassment. This was because:

  • the perception of the person claiming harassment was a key and indeed mandatory component in determining whether harassment had occurred
  • as confirmed by the relevant authorities, if there was no awareness, there could be no perception.

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Holiday Pay: How to calculate holiday pay on termination of employment

In Connor v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2023] EAT 42 the EAT considered the provisions of a ‘relevant agreement’ reached in relation to holiday pay on termination of employment and how these compared to the calculations provided for by the Working Time Regulations 1998 (‘WTR’) and found it not to be compatible.

In this case the Claimant’s employment contract stated that holiday pay on termination of employment would be calculated based on 1/365th annual salary. This meant, on that upon his termination, he received a lower payment for accrued holiday than that which he would have received using the calculation set-out in the WTR.

The tribunal held that the 1/365th calculation was a valid ‘relevant agreement’ under Regulation 14(3) (which states that the amount of holiday pay due on termination of employment is either that which would be prescribed if the formula set out in the WTR were applied or such other sum which is stated to be payable on termination of employment pursuant to a ‘relevant agreement’) and that therefore there had been no unlawful deduction from the claimant’s wages.

The EAT disagreed. They held that a ‘relevant agreement’ under Regulation 14(3) on the payment of holiday on termination of employment cannot result in a payment which is lower than that which would be calculated using the method set out in the WTR. The Claimant was entitled to the higher amount. . Regulation 14 provides a method of calculation for the purposes of regulations 13 and 13A for an incomplete leave year. The entitlement to annual leave, and payment, are not modified by regulation 14. The regulation provides a formula of calculation which promotes the right to annual leave and the attendant payment for holiday. The phrase “such sum as may be provided for the purposes of this regulation in a relevant agreement” refers to any agreement that provides a formula which is in keeping with the rights provided for in the regulations.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

Back

The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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