Tag: #victimisation

banner services

News & Views

Employment Law Case Update – October 2024

  • Anne-Marie Pavitt,

  • 30th October 2024

Employment Law

This month our case digest is dominated by unfair dismissal and victimisation claims. The usual advice follows: if you’re going to dismiss someone, make sure you follow procedure and do it properly, a protected disclosure only gains its protection from being in the public interest (not that of the individual), even unions can get it wrong, and if you’re going to submit a large remedy claim have substantial medical evidence to back it up.

  • Unfair Dismissal: Tribunal fails to consider fairness of final warning
  • Unfair Dismissal: Claimant can’t rely on protected disclosures if not made in public interest
  • Victimisation: Tribunal incorrectly applied burden of proof provisions and rejected protected act
  • Victimisation: Substantial lack of medical evidence and self-diagnosis not enough for high value remedy claim

Unfair Dismissal: Tribunal fails to consider fairness of final warning

In Thomas v Brandpath UK Ltd [2024] EAT 150, the EAT allowed the claimant’s claim for an unfair dismissal. After an altercation between the claimant and a colleague, the claimant was signed-off sick for a significant period and the respondent conducted a disciplinary hearing in her absence. The claimant was dismissed by the respondent and the Employment Tribunal (ET) concluded that the claimant had acted “inappropriately”. The claimant argued that the ET: (i) did not consider and decide whether the issue of the final warning was manifestly unfair; (ii) there was a failure to apply the relevant guidelines; (iii) the decision was perverse; and (iv) that there was unfairness in proceeding with the disciplinary hearing, in the absence of the claimant, rather than delaying to allow for a possible improvement in her medical condition.

The EAT held that the ET erred in law is its assessment of the reason for dismissal, in failing to determine the question of whether the final warning was manifestly unfair, having identified that as one of the issues for determination. It failed to properly consider the question of whether the respondent had investigated that fell within the band of reasonable responses. There was no clear finding of what the claimant had done or said that was “inappropriate”. They upheld grounds (i) and (ii) of the appeal. It was therefore not necessary to go on to consider grounds (iii) and (iv).

Back to the top

Unfair Dismissal: Claimant can’t rely on protected disclosures if not made in public interest

In Dowding v The Character Group Plc [2024] EAT 153, the claimant in the employment tribunal was the finance director of the respondent, a company listed on the Alternative Investment Market. Following his dismissal he complained of unfair dismissal for the reason or principal reason that he had made protected disclosures, alternatively ordinary unfair dismissal. The tribunal concluded that the claimant had not, in law, made protected disclosures, because the disclosures relied upon were not believed by him to have been made in the public interest (alternatively, if they were, his belief was not reasonable). Nor in any event was the claimant dismissed by reason of those disclosures.

The tribunal found that this was a fair dismissal by reason of a breakdown in trust and confidence that had been caused by the claimant’s conduct. At a further costs hearing the tribunal awarded the respondent costs, in a capped amount, subject to detailed assessment on the indemnity basis. It rejected a costs application by the claimant himself. The respondent also successfully sought its costs in respect of the costs hearing, which it had limited to the maximum that could be summarily awarded, of £20,000.

The claimant’s appeal against the decision dismissing the ordinary unfair dismissal complaint was unsuccessful. An appeal against the costs decision succeeded in two respects. The EAT concluded that, under the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013, the tribunal does have the power to direct that a detailed costs assessment be on the indemnity basis; but the tribunal had not shown whether, or if so, why, it had decided that such a direction was warranted in this case, applying the guidelines in Howman v Queen Elizabeth Hospital, UKEAT/0509/12/JOJ. In respect of the “costs of costs” award, the tribunal had not considered whether the sum of £20,000 was warranted having regard to the nature, gravity and effect of the conduct which gave rise to the award; or if it had considered that, it had not sufficiently explained its decision in that respect.

Back to the top

Victimisation: Tribunal incorrectly applied burden of proof provisions and rejected protected act

In Edwards v Unite the Union and Others [2024] EAT 151, the Employment Tribunal was found by the EAT to have erred in its approach to the burden of proof. The Claimant had been employed as an employment law solicitor for the RMT. He wished to pursue proceedings against the RMT. He was a member of the Unite the Union (“the Union”) and sought to obtain “industrial and legal representation” from the Union against the RMT in respect of employment and personal injury claims. The Union took advice in respect of his claims and represented him in some of them. The Claimant was dissatisfied with aspects of the decision making and service/representation provided to him by the Union. He asserted that the Union and some of its officers had discriminated against him and subjected him to victimisation. He brought a number of claims before an Employment Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected his claims and concluded that the burden of proof had not shifted to the Union in respect of the victimisation allegation, and determined that one email the Claimant sent was not a protected act for the purposes of the claims of victimisation. The Claimant appealed.

The appeal was allowed, concluding that the Tribunal had erred in its application of the burden of proof provisions in consideration of relevant authorities and using guidance on the approach to the burden of proof provisions. As to the second ground of appeal, in context and applying the correct legal principles, and on a fair reading of the relevant email, the Claimant had made an allegation of disability discrimination. The allegation was that the First Respondent had failed to adjust its processes and that as a result, the Claimant, a disabled person, suffered harm. This could be understood to be an allegation of disability discrimination.

Back to the top

Victimisation: Substantial lack of medical evidence and self-diagnosis not enough for high value remedy claim

In McInerney v Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust[2024] EAT 158, having been awarded compensation in respect of remedy for a successful claim of unfair constructive dismissal, the Employment Tribunal (ET) made a further reserved judgment in respect of the remedy for victimisation claim which amounted to £20,000 for injury to feelings, £10,000 for aggravated damages (which were not challenged) and £23,344.30 for loss of earnings, against which Dr McInerney appealed. The final schedule of loss submitted by the appellant put her losses at £2,114,140.90 gross. The EAT dismissed her appeal against the findings made in this further reserved judgment by the ET.

The appellant had been employed by the respondent NHS Trust as a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at a hospital until her retirement. The appellant brought two claims in the ET, alleging acts of victimisation that led to her resignation. Her victimisation claim was based on the respondent’s refusal to consider her application to work on a part-time basis as Forensic Psychiatrist in the respondent’s Forensic Gender Clinic and, specifically, refusing to allow her to apply for the role, not acknowledging or considering her subsequent application and not offering her the role. She contended that her mental health issues, allegedly caused by the victimisation, prevented her from working until the age of 75, as she had intended. The appellant succeeded in both complaints. The ET was highly critical of the actions of the respondent that resulted in the appellant’s resignation, concluding that the respondent had fundamentally breached the claimant’s contract of employment.

The ET found as fact that the appellant had not suffered a loss of confidence because of being victimised that prevented her from undertaking medico-legal work. Among other things, the appellant submitted that the ET failed to apply a percentage chance approach to the medico-legal loss or had otherwise failed to give adequate reasons as to its decision on that point. The EAT held that the ET did not err in law in failing to apply a percentage chance approach to the medico-legal loss. On a proper reading of the judgment, the ET found as a fact that the appellant had not suffered a fundamental loss of confidence that prevented her from carrying out medico-legal work. The ET had been entitled to consider the lack of significant supporting medical evidence to support the very substantial asserted losses (a single letter from a doctor – Consultant Psychiatrist in Psychotherapy, no longer practising) and that it was a significant omission. This is a very high value claim which primarily rests with the appellant’s financial losses she says arise as a result of her mental health issues cause by the victimisation by the respondent, and as a consequence, the ET consider medical evidence to be essential to enable proper consideration of the effect of the victimisation on the appellant’s mental health. She had also relied on her own evidence, as a Consultant Psychiatrist, but relying on self-diagnosis in such a high claim would in itself raise potential issues, not least being the cynical view that she would know what to say to support her own claim. Further, the reasons of the ET had been more than sufficient for the appellant to understand why she failed in that element of the claim for loss of earnings.

Back to the top

Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

Back

The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

Related News

banner services

News & Views

Employment News – Case Update March 2022

  • Employment,

  • 22nd March 2022

Employment Law

A round-up of the most significant employment law cases to be published over the last month including how to establish worker status, the use of PILON clauses, privacy regarding email at work and what test to use to determine detriment in victimisation cases.

  • Worker Status: “Irreducible minimum of obligation” is not a prerequisite for establishing worker status
  • Contract: No dismissal where employer invokes contractual PILON after employee’s resignation to bring forward termination date
  • Privacy: Appeal dismissed against judgment that personal emails sent from business account were not private or confidential
  • Victimisation: What test should be applied when determining if a Claimant has suffered a detriment under a victimisation claim?

Worker Status: “Irreducible minimum of obligation” is not a prerequisite for establishing worker status

In, Nursing and Midwifery Council v Somerville [2022] EWCA Civ 229, the Court of Appeal has confirmed that an “irreducible minimum of obligation” is not needed to establish worker status under the Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTR 1998). Mr Somerville, a panel member chair of the Nursing and Midwifery Council’s Fitness to Practice Committee, worked under an overarching contract. This contract did not oblige the Nursing and Midwifery Council (the Council) to offer hearing dates to him, and he was under no obligation to accept any dates offered to him. Applying Uber BV and others v Aslam and others [2021] UKSC 5, the court found that the fact that the overarching contract did not impose an obligation to work did not preclude a finding that he was a worker when he was actually working.

In addition, the fact that Mr Somerville could withdraw from an individual agreement to attend a hearing even after he had accepted a particular date did not change the Court of Appeal’s view. He entered into an individual contract for an individual assignment which existed until terminated and had to be read alongside the overarching contract. If an individual contract was not terminated and he chaired a hearing, he would, in the language of section 2(1)(b) of the WTR 1998, have worked under a contract personally to perform services. There is no indication that there must be a distinct, super-added obligation to provide services independent from the provision of the services on a particular occasion. When deciding whether a specific agreement to provide services on a particular occasion amounted to a worker’s contract, the fact that the parties were not obliged to offer, or accept, any future work was irrelevant.

The Court of Appeal’s decision confirms what was previously understood to be the position, that an “irreducible minimum of obligation” is not an essential requirement for worker status. The analysis of the Uber Supreme Court decision also adds to the often-fraught discussion of what it means to be a worker. That said, the Court of Appeal’s decision is clear: where an individual is, in fact, working or providing services personally under a contract, a finding of worker status can be made even where no overarching contract imposing an obligation to provide and accept work exists.

Back to the top

Contract: No dismissal where employer invokes contractual PILON after employee’s resignation to bring forward termination date

In Fentem v Outform EMEA Ltd [2022] EAT 36, the EAT has held that is bound by the decision in Marshall (Cambridge) v Hamblin [1994] ICR 362. Accordingly, where an employer invokes a clause in an employee’s contract enabling it, following the employee’s resignation, to terminate their employment immediately by making a prescribed payment calculated by reference to the unexpired period of the employee’s notice, there is no dismissal under section 95(1)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Despite reaching this conclusion, the EAT expressed misgivings about the decision in Marshall. It was strongly inclined to view Marshall as wrong and could see nothing in the reasoning that supported the conclusion that there was no dismissal in that case.

However, the EAT could only depart from its own decisions in the narrow circumstances set out in British Gas Trading v Lock [2016] ICR 503. These include where the earlier decision was not merely wrong, but manifestly wrong. It was the outcome or proposition of law for which the decision stood that had to be the focus of consideration. If there is an argument that can reasonably be advanced in defence of the outcome that is itself not manifestly wrong, then the legal outcome could not be said to be manifestly wrong.

In this case, the employer relied on authorities concerning a scenario in which an employee’s termination date was brought forward with their agreement following their dismissal. The employee argued that these were not relevant because he had not agreed to his termination date being brought forward. The EAT accepted that these authorities may not inform the approach to the issue, but it could not say that they obviously would not. Further, it might be arguable that a contractual provision could have the legal effect that, following a resignation, the employer could cause the employment to end sooner than the date given by the employee, even without the employee’s agreement, by making a contractually-prescribed payment by reference to the unexpired notice period, in a way that only alters how and when the resignation takes effect.

Since these points could not be said to be obviously unarguable, the decision in Marshall could not be said to be manifestly wrong. Therefore, the EAT could not depart from it.

Back to the top

Privacy: Appeal dismissed against judgment that personal emails sent from business account were not private or confidential

In Brake and another v Guy and others [2022] EWCA Civ 235, the Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal in unsuccessful proceedings for misuse of private information and breach of confidence which arose in relation to a former employee’s personal emails that were sent from a business email account. The email account was used to receive enquiries about the employer’s services.

Baker LJ’s leading judgment emphasised that the success of privacy and confidentiality claims turned on the specific facts, and considered that it had been open to the judge at first instance, HHJ Paul Matthews, to find as he did. In particular, he said that it was telling that the former employee (who was the claimant in the proceedings) had shared access to the email account with two colleagues, and that her employer had set up personal accounts in the names of each of the employees at the same time as it created the business account. Baker LJ also agreed with the first instance judge that, had there been a reasonable expectation of privacy or circumstances of confidence, disclosure of the emails by the defendants for the purpose of obtaining professional advice would not have breached privacy or confidence and, even if it had, damages would have been limited.

The only point of disagreement with the earlier judgments related to HHJ Paul Matthews’ decision to split out the issue of the “iniquity defence” (that is, the public interest defence, which the judge had held was available in relation to privacy and breach of confidence claims where the defendant accessed the information unlawfully), leaving it until after his trial of other matters. Baker LJ considered that any fraudulent conduct on the part of the claimant was likely to be relevant to whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy or duty of confidence and, if there was, whether they had been breached. He concluded, however, that this had not been determinative in the present case.

This judgment provides some guidance on ensuring that an employer will have full access to emails sent via a business account. In particular, it may be advisable to create individual email accounts for each employee who operates from the central business email address and to require them to limit private emails to the account set up in their name.

Back to the top

Victimisation: What test should be applied when determining if a Claimant has suffered a detriment under a victimisation claim?

In Warburton v The Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police [2022] EAT 42, the EAT was had to consider whether the tribunal had asked itself the correct question when deciding whether or not the claimant had suffered a detriment, and if not, which was the correct test to use.

The claimant had applied to be a police officer with the Northamptonshire Police force. In his application email he referred to what was accepted as being a protected act, namely, proceedings he was bringing in another employment tribunal against another police force (Hertfordshire Constabulary) alleging unlawful discrimination on the grounds of disability. He had made an application to join that force, which resulted in an offer which was subsequently withdrawn. The claimant was later told by the respondent that his application form had not been accepted.

The claimant pursued a claim for victimisation. The respondent’s argument for why the claimant’s application had not been successful was not due to the protected act but owing to the failure of another force (Avon and Somerset Constabulary) to provide information to allow the vetting procedure to proceed. The tribunal found in favour of the respondent and the claimant appealed.

The appeal was predicated on the basis that the employment tribunal had erred in law by misstating the test for victimisation, and the four other claims flowed from this.

The EAT held that the tribunal had not asked itself the correct question when deciding that the claimant had suffered no detriment. The key test is from the House of Lords in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary[2003] ICR 337: “Is the treatment of such a kind that a reasonable worker would or might take the view that in all the circumstances it was to his detriment?”  The EAT concluded that detriment is to be interpreted widely in this context and it is what a reasonable worker might think, not just the view of a tribunal, to satisfy the test. Therefore, it was not particularly difficult to establish a detriment for these purposes and but the EAT also found that the tribunal had also not applied the correct legal test to the causation or “reason why” question. The appeal was allowed and the victimisation claim was remitted for rehearing.

Back to the top

Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com.

Back

The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

Related News