Tag: #unfairdismissal

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Employment Law Case Update – September 2024

  • Employment,

  • 27th September 2024

Employment Law

This month our employment law case updates contain some key issues in employment law: discrimination protections, and the balance between the rights and freedoms of individuals and the effect their words or acts may have on those around them.

  • Collective Agreements: Supreme Court restrains Tesco from ‘firing and rehiring’ employees on less favourable terms
  • Unfair Dismissal: Dismissal based on capability and performance is fair
  • Equality Act: Complaint by LGBT charity about ‘gender critical’ tweets did not induce or cause discrimination
  • Equality Act: English Nationalist loses appeal for protection of his views

Collective Agreements: Supreme Court restrains Tesco from ‘firing and rehiring’ employees on less favourable terms

In Tesco Stores Ltd v Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) [2024] UKSC 28, in a unanimous decision in which Lord Burrows and Lady Simler delivered the leading judgment, the Supreme Court agreed with the previous High Court decision and restored the injunction restraining Tesco from terminating employment contracts for the specific purpose of depriving employees of their ‘permanent’ contractual right to retained pay and offering re-engagement without this inclusion. It was held that the employment contracts contained an implied term which prevented Tesco from exercising dismissal rights for this purpose.

The Supreme Court allowed the appellant employees’ (and their union’s) appeal, concerning whether the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, had erred in finding that the respondent company (Tesco) had been entitled to terminate its employees’ employment contracts for the specific purpose of depriving them of ‘retained pay’ (RP) (a financial contractual entitlement which was described as a ‘permanent’ benefit), and to offer re-engagement on terms without RP (the ‘fire and re-hire’ mechanism). The High Court had granted an injunction to restrain Tesco from terminating the employees’ employment to remove the RP term. The Court of Appeal had allowed Tesco’s appeal. The court ruled among other things, that: (i) on the true construction of the express RP term in the relevant employment contracts, the word ‘permanent’ conveyed that the right to RP was not time-limited in any way and would continue to be paid to employees for as long as their employment in the same role continued, subject only to the other two qualifications set out in the RP term; (ii) however, applying the test of business efficacy (or obviousness), Tesco was precluded by an implied term from exercising the contractual right to dismiss the claimants on notice for the purpose of removing or diminishing their right to receive permanent RP; (iii) the exception to the general rule that a contract of employment was not specifically enforceable was engaged, in circumstances where there had been no breakdown of mutual trust and confidence (Tesco was prepared to re-engage the relevant employees), and where damages would be inadequate; and (iv) accordingly, the injunction which the High Court had granted in favour of the employees would be reinstated.

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Unfair Dismissal: Dismissal based on capability and performance is fair

In Kikwera-Akaka v Salvation Army Trading Company Ltd [2024] EAT 49, the EAT found the Employment Tribunal did not err in concluding that the Claimant had been fairly dismissed for capability and performance. The Claimant worked for the Respondent in one of its charity shops. Many of the staff who work in those shops are volunteers and some have additional vulnerabilities. An incident occurred between the Claimant and a vulnerable volunteer, as a result of which he received a final written warning. That stated that further misconduct may result in dismissal. In addition, he was placed on a personal improvement plan (PIP). The Tribunal found that this was specifically linked to the incident with the volunteer: one aspect of his performance which the Respondent made clear needed to improve through that PIP was his interaction with volunteers. The Claimant did not consider that there was anything which he needed to address in that regard. The PIP ended a few days earlier than planned. The Claimant was invited to a performance capability meeting to discuss the PIP. He was expressly warned that dismissal may result. The Claimant’s position regarding his interaction with volunteers did not change: he rejected the suggestion that he needed to improve or that he required further training. He was dismissed.

The Claimant’s appeal against dismissal, in which he maintained his previous stance, was unsuccessful. On the facts the Tribunal concluded that the Claimant had been given a fair opportunity to improve his performance: his interaction with volunteers was a significant and important part of his performance, and was also linked to the misconduct which led to the final written warning. The Tribunal did not err in its approach or in its application of relevant legal principles. Observations upon the differences, and similarities, in a fair approach when an employer considers dismissal for capability compared to misconduct.

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Equality Act: Complaint by LGBT charity about ‘gender critical’ tweets did not induce or cause discrimination

In Bailey v Stonewall Equality Ltd [2024] EAT 119, the EAT held that an Employment Tribunal did not err in rejecting a claim, by a barrister who holds gender critical beliefs, that Stonewall, an LGBT campaign charity, caused or induced her chambers to discriminate against her on the grounds of her protected belief, contrary to section 111 of Equality Act 2010 (i.e. relating to instructing, causing or inducing another person to contravene the Act). The tribunal’s finding that the charity’s complaint was a ‘protest’, without any specific aim in mind except perhaps a public denial of the chambers’ association with the barrister’s views and contained no element of threat, did not satisfy a finding of inducing or causing an act of discrimination.

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Equality Act: English Nationalist loses appeal for protection of his views

In Thomas v Surrey and Borders Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (1) and Brett (2) [2024] EAT 141, the EAT ruled that English nationalism is not a legally protected philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010). The Claimant, Steven Thomas, a health worker, has lost his appeal against an employment tribunal’s decision that his belief in English nationalism, which included anti-Islamic views, was not one which was protected under the EqA 2010. This original decision was reached at a preliminary hearing in the claim he brought against a National Health Service (NHS) trust after it ended his employment after three months.

Judge Clive Sheldon KC wrote in the judgment of the EAT:  ‘The Claimant’s views are of an English nationalism which believes that there is no place in British society for Muslims or Islam itself… The Claimant is not prevented from holding his views. But he is outside of the right to complain that he has been discriminated against in relation to those beliefs.’

‘English Nationalism can be a legally protected philosophical belief, but the Claimant’s specific views, which included that Muslims should be forcibly deported from the UK, did not merit protection under free expression rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights,’ he added.

This was because his expressed beliefs violated another right in the doctrine—that no one can perform acts ‘aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms’ of others, and, added the judge, he cannot also claim protection from discrimination under the EqA 2010 because his views are not worthy of respect in a democratic society.

Thomas’ solicitor, Robin Tilbrook of Tilbrook Solicitors, said that his client will take his case to the Court of Appeal, or to the European Court of Human Rights if necessary. Tilbrook said he believed the judgment misinterpreted the European Convention article that limits Thomas’ free speech rights as binding on the employer, rather than on the state. He likened Thomas’ case to Redfearn v United Kingdom [2013] IRLR 51, where another English Nationalist won his European human rights case despite losing his employment claim in the UK.

His past political affiliation to the English Democrats, a minor far-right party, meant that Thomas was sanctioned because his beliefs were ‘unacceptable to the woke view of the world’, Tilbrook added. Tilbrook is the current national chair of the English Democrats.

‘In this case, there are comments about Islam that have taken my client’s views out of that protection’, Tilbrook said. ‘They have put my client in a position where he’s always in danger of being fired by an employer.’

The case is part of a surge in claims about protected beliefs that lawyers say are incrementally blurring the lines between unconventional but legally valid views and politicised public debates.

The trust argued in June that Thomas’ views were ‘akin to Nazism‘, which British courts have ruled is not protected. They also defended the employment tribunal claim on the basis that he was actually dismissed because he lied in his résumé about an unspent conviction.

Thomas had either posted himself, or reposted, on social media platform X, comments such as ‘Ethnic cleansing…always happens to Muslims…wonder why?‘ and used the hashtag ‘#RemoveAllMuslims’, according to the judgment of the employment tribunal.

Oscar Davies of Garden Court Chambers, counsel for Thomas, argued in written submissions in the appeal case that the views of the claimant ‘might well be considered offensive and abhorrent to some’—but did not seek to destroy the rights of anyone.

As such, they did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights, Davies added.

But Sheldon J upheld the employment tribunal’s reasoning for dismissing the case.

‘A finding that the claimant’s beliefs included the banning of Islam or the forcible removal of Muslims from the United Kingdom is only consistent with an infringement—and in fact the destruction—of rights of others’, he ruled.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – July 2024

  • Employment,

  • 26th July 2024

Employment Law Employment Law

This month’s case digest covers how to compare workers in cases of less favourable treatment, considering different aspects of unfair dismissal claims, the intricacies of holiday pay accrual, and when time spent doing something work-related is not actually working time for the purposes of pay and therefore the National Minimum Wage.

  • Worker Status: Less favourable treatment on ground of part-time working
  • Unfair Dismissal: Care workers’ vaccine preference can’t top residents’ safety
  • Unfair Dismissal: ET made inadequate findings on employer’s search for suitable alternative employment
  • Holiday Pay: EAT considers Coronavirus and Shimizu carry-over claims
  • National Minimum Wage: Time spent travelling on employer’s minibus to and from place of work is not ‘time work’

Worker Status: Less favourable treatment on ground of part-time working

In Augustine v Data Cars Ltd [2024] EAT 117, the EAT held that a part-time taxi driver was treated less favourably by the employer’s application of a £148 per week flat rate circuit fee because, applying the pro rata temporis principle, the claimant was:

  • paying a higher circuit fee than his full-time comparator when considered as a proportion of his hours worked, and/or
  • was taking home a lower hourly rate of pay.

The principle of pro rata temporis means whereby when a comparable permanent employee is employed with specific terms and conditions of employment, the fixed-term employee will be employed with the same terms and conditions of employment, based on a comparison of the period of employment of the comparable permanent employee and the fixed-term employee respectively.

However, because the part-time working was not the ‘sole’ reason for the less favourable treatment, the imposition of the flat rate fee did not breach the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000, SI 2000/1551. While the EAT preferred the test on causation set out by the EAT (England) in Sharma v Manchester CC [2008] IRLR 336 and Carl v University of Sheffield [2009] IRLR 616 (that the part-time working has to be the ‘effective and predominant’ cause of the less favourable treatment) it nonetheless applied the test set out by the Inner House of the Court of Session (CSIH) (Scotland) in McMenemy v Capita Business Services Ltd [2007] IRLR 400 (that the part-time working has to be the sole cause of the less favourable treatment) because it recognised the legitimate public interest in having a consistent approach in cases both north and south of the Scotland/England border.

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Unfair Dismissal: Care workers’ vaccine preference can’t top residents’ safety

In Masiero and Others v Barchester Healthcare Ltd [2024] EAT 112, the EAT has agreed that a healthcare provider’s mandatory coronavirus (COVID-19) vaccine policy did not infringe a group of care home workers’ human rights, ruling that they were fairly dismissed because the company had a right to protect its residents.

In particular, the EAT held that the employment tribunal had been entitled to find that:

  • the claimants’ dismissals were compatible with their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998;
  • the respondent’s policy did not involve the imposition of a mandatory requirement to submit to medical treatment in abrogation of the claimant’s right to free and informed consent;
  • the interference with the claimants’ Article 8 rights was justified in pursuit of the respondent’s aims of (among other things) protecting care home residents’ rights to life under Article 2.

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Unfair Dismissal: ET made inadequate findings on employer’s search for suitable alternative employment

In Birkett v Integral UK [2024] EAT 107, the EAT held that the employment tribunal had made insufficient findings in respect of:

  • the respondent’s process of searching for alternative jobs, at the time of the claimant’s dismissal, and
  • the circumstances in which the claimant was unsuccessful for a specific vacancy, for which he had been interviewed.

Both issues were relevant to the fairness of the claimant’s dismissal for the purposes of section 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996:

  • merely to state a conclusion on a disputed point that there were, for example, no vacancies, without any analysis of, and findings on, the respondent’s enquiries, was not sufficient;
  • if findings are not made about the basic fairness of the recruitment process, the risk is that it would be open to any employer to absolve itself of liability by offering an interview, without a wider analysis of the fairness for the purposes of Employment Rights Act 1996, s 98(4).

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Holiday Pay: EAT considers Coronavirus and Shimizu carry-over claims

In Knight v Off Broadway Ltd [2024] EAT 109, the claimant, a bar manager, brought claims that, in addition to a payment in lieu of holiday accrued in the leave year in which his employment terminated, he was also entitled to carry-over unused holiday from previous years.

The EAT held that the employment tribunal had:

  • correctly found on the facts of the case that there were no Covid-related circumstances which entitled the claimant to carry-over unused holiday entitlement under the then in place (but now withdrawn) amendments to the Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1833 (WTR 1998);
  • erred in failing to consider whether the respondent had done sufficient to inform the claimant, in particular, that any unused holiday at the end of the holiday year could not be carried over (see Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Főrderung der Wissenschaffen e.V. v Shimizu [2018] All ER (D) 30 (Nov), the principles from which have now been incorporated into the WTR 1998).

HHJ Auerbach noted that in Shimizu the Court of Justice of the European Union referred to the employer being required to ensure that the worker is actually in a position to take the paid annual leave to which he is entitled by encouraging him ‘formally if need be’ to do so, while ‘informing’ him in good time that leave not taken during the holiday year will be lost. He said that would be sufficient in the given case to satisfy that obligation will be a fact-sensitive matter for the tribunal.

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National Minimum Wage: Time spent travelling on employer’s minibus to and from place of work is not ‘time work’

In Taylors Service Ltd v Commissioners for HM Revenue and Customs [2024] EAT 102, HMRC issued the respondent (a company providing labour to poultry farms around the country) with a notices of underpayment of the national minimum wage because it did not pay its workers on zero hours contracts for time spent travelling on its minibuses from their home addresses to and from farms. The respondent appealed, first to the employment tribunal which dismissed the appeal, and then to the EAT.

The EAT allowing the appeal, holding that:

  • the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Royal Mencap Society v Tomlinson-Blake [2021] IRLR 466 to the interpretation of the National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015 (NMW 2015), SI 2015/621, regs 30 and 32 also applies to regs 30 and 34 and, accordingly, time spent ‘just’ travelling is not ‘time work’ for the purposes of reg 30 unless it is deemed to be such by reg 34;
  • as the tribunal in this case had found that the workers were not working in the ordinary sense when on the minibus, and were not deemed to be engaged in time work by virtue of reg 34, the only conclusion open to the tribunal on the facts as it found them to be was that the workers were not engaged in ‘time work’ for the purposes of NMW 2015, SI 2015/621, reg 30.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

Back

The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – March 2024

  • Employment,

  • 24th March 2024

Employment Law

This month’s case updates include a case of unfair dismissal which sparked a debate over the bounds of reasonable responses of an employer in dismissing an employee for posting a racist ‘joke’ on an intranet, we scrutinize parental leave protection against dismissal, look at whether employers can be held vicariously liable for detriments amounting to dismissal caused by co-workers in whistleblowing cases, and take a look at the potential discrimination of a Christian actor removed from a role due to anti-gay social media posts, although she admitted she would never had played that role anyway. Lastly, looking at Equal Pay, we investigate the ‘material factor defence’.

  • Unfair Dismissal: Band of Reasonable responses
  • Parental Leave: Protection against dismissal can arise before employee gives notice to take parental leave
  • Whistleblowing: Employer cannot be vicariously liable for detriment caused by act of co-worker which amounts to dismissal
  • Discrimination: Fired ‘Color Purple ‘actor loses appeal over Christian beliefs
  • Equal Pay: Identification of decision-maker is not essential to material factor defence 

Unfair Dismissal: Band of Reasonable responses

In Vaultex UK Ltd v Bialas [2024] EAT 19 the question before the EAT was whether the original tribunal had been entitled to decide that a decision to dismiss an employee for posting a racist ‘joke’ on his employer’s intranet fell outside the band of reasonable responses.

The Claimant posted a racist joke on the Respondent’s intranet, which was used by all its employees. The Respondent was a large company which conducts cash processing. The Claimant had a long, unblemished service record and apologised for his actions but nonetheless, the Respondent decided to dismiss the Claimant for gross misconduct.

The tribunal held that the Claimant had been unfairly dismissed, and had even directed itself, citing pertinent authority, that, in relation to sanction, a band of reasonable responses approach should be applied, and that the tribunal “must not simply substitute its judgment for that of the employer in this case”. The tribunal concluded that, given the Claimant’s record and the fact he had apologised, any sanction above a final written warning fell outside the band of reasonable responses that a reasonable employer could have reached.

The Respondent appealed. The first ground of the appeal was the assertion that the tribunal nevertheless committed the error of substituting its own opinion of the appropriate sanction for that of the Respondent. The second ground was that, on the question of whether the sanction of dismissal was within the band of reasonable responses, the tribunal reached a conclusion which was perverse or not within the range of reasonable decisions open to it.

The EAT found that this was not a case where the tribunal found that there was unfairness because a relevant circumstance was not considered by the employer at all. To the contrary, the tribunal specifically found that the Claimant’s long service and the fact that this was a first offence were taken into account by the Respondent. Secondly, given that the tribunal found that the Respondent’s policies and procedures made it clear that conduct of this sort was considered to be potentially so serious that it could result in dismissal for a first offence, and, indeed, that they explained that, even if not directed at another employee, such conduct might amount to discriminatory harassment of colleagues exposed to it, and that this post was placed on an intranet used by the entire workforce, they did not find that it was reasonably open to the tribunal to conclude, if it did, that the Claimant’s prior clean record of long service meant that dismissal was outside of the reasonable band of responses.

The EAT therefore held that the tribunal had, in fact, substituted its own view for that of the Respondent and upheld both grounds of appeal. The EAT concluded that “any tribunal properly applying the law could not have concluded other than that dismissal, however harsh the tribunal might think the decision, was within the band of reasonable responses open to the employer in this case“. It held that the response was within the band of reasonable responses and therefore substituted a finding of fair dismissal.

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Parental Leave: Protection against dismissal can arise before employee gives notice to take parental leave

In Hilton Foods Solutions Ltd v Wright [2024] EAT 28 the EAT had to consider how protection from dismissal arises regarding parental leave. An employee is protected against being dismissed because s/he took parental leave. In broad terms, an employee is also protected if s/he ‘sought’ to take parental leave, pursuant to regulation 20 of the Maternity and Parental Leave Regulations 1999 (MAPLE Regs), SI 1999/3312. His Honour Judge Tayler noted that this appeal raises one point of construction; what is required for an employee to have ‘sought’ to take parental leave? The Respondent argued that the employee must have complied with certain formal requirements of the MAPLE Regs that are a prerequisite of exercising the right to take parental leave. The Claimant (Mr Wright) argued that whether an employee has sought to take parental leave is a question of fact for the appreciation of the Employment Tribunal having considered all the relevant evidence.

The EAT held that the use of the word ‘sought’ was of an ordinary English construction and therefore the question of whether an employee has ‘sought’ to take parental leave for the purposes of this regulation 20 should be based on a factual determination made by the employment tribunal having considered the relevant evidence and circumstances. In addition, it concluded that there is no absolute requirement that the employee must have given notice to take parental leave pursuant to paragraphs 1(b) and 3 of MAPLE Regs, Schedule 2.

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Whistleblowing: Employer cannot be vicariously liable for detriment caused by act of co-worker which amounts to dismissal

In Wicked Vision Ltd v Rice [2024] EAT 29, the Claimant brought a claim of automatic unfair dismissal against the Respondent on the basis that he was dismissed because he had made protected disclosures. The Claimant later tried to amend his claim, to add that the act of the dismissing officer in dismissing him was a detriment on grounds of whistleblowing for which the Respondent was liable. The tribunal allowed the amendment.

At appeal, the EAT disagreed with the tribunal and held that:

  • a claimant cannot claim that their employer (a company) is vicariously liable under section 47B(1B) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996) for the act of a co-worker (in this case the company’s owner) for the ‘detriment of dismissal’; and
  • such a claim is barred by ERA 1996, s 47B(2) because the alleged detriment ‘amounts to dismissal (within the meaning of Part X)’ of ERA 1996.

Therefore the correct claim was the one originally made by the Claimant.

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Discrimination: Fired ‘Color Purple’ actor loses appeal over Christian beliefs

In Omooba v (1) Michael Garrett Associates Ltd (ta Global Artists) (2) Leicester Theatre Ltd [2024] EAT 30 the EAT held that a theatre company did not discriminate against a Christian actor when it dropped her from a role in a musical production of ‘The Color Purple’ over an anti-gay social media post.

The Claimant was an actor, cast to play the role of Celie in the stage production of ‘The Color Purple’. Celie is seen as an iconic lesbian role and, when the claimant’s casting was announced, a social media storm developed relating to a past Facebook post in which she had expressed her belief that homosexuality was a sin. The consequences of that storm led to the termination of the Claimant’s contracts with the theatre (the Second Respondent) and her agency (the First Respondent). Arising out of those events, she brought Employment Tribunal (“ET”) claims of religion and belief discrimination and harassment, and breach of contract. Shortly before the ET hearing, having only then read the script, the Claimant volunteered she would never in fact have played the part of Celie, and would have resigned from the role in due course. She continued with her claims, but these were all dismissed and an award of costs made against her.

The Claimant appealed against those decisions, and against a further order relating to the continued use of the hearing documents. The Respondents cross-appealed the ET’s finding that the Claimant had suffered detrimental treatment, its failure to find that there was an occupational requirement that the actor playing Celie had not manifested a belief such as that expressed in the Claimant’s Facebook post, and its failure to find that keeping the Claimant on the books of the agency would effectively have amounted to compelled speech.

The EAT dismissed the appeals. Although, contrary to the Respondents’ first ground of cross-appeal, it had been open to the ET to find that the Claimant had suffered detrimental treatment, it had not fallen into the error of confusing reason and motive but had permissibly found that, whilst the Claimant’s belief formed part of the context, it was not a reason for either her dismissal by the theatre or the termination of her agency contract. In the circumstances, it was unnecessary to rule on the occupational requirement or compelled speech arguments. As for the harassment claim, the ET had not failed to have regard to the impact on the Claimant of the social medial storm (the “other circumstances” for the purposes of section 26(4)(b) Equality Act 2010), but had found that the Respondents had not caused, or contributed to, that circumstance, and permissibly found that the Claimant’s treatment had not reasonably had the requisite effect.

The ET had also been entitled to reject the Claimant’s argument that any breach of ECHR rights would amount to a “violation of dignity”; that argument was academic, as the ET had not found that any of the Claimant’s ECHR rights had been infringed. The ET had also been correct to dismiss the Claimant’s breach of contract claim against the Second Respondent. She had been offered the full contract fee, so there was no pecuniary loss. Moreover, as the Claimant knew she would not play a lesbian character, but had not raised this with the theatre, or sought to inform herself as to the requirements of the role of Celie, she was in repudiatory breach of her express obligations, and of the implied term of trust and confidence. Although the Second Respondent was not aware of this at the date of termination, no damages (e.g. for loss of publicity/enhanced reputation) could be due.

In making a costs award against the Claimant, the ET had been entitled to reach the conclusion that her claims either had no reasonable prospect of success from the outset, or that they had no reasonable prospect once the Claimant realised that she would never in fact have played the role of Celie, or that the conduct of the claims had been unreasonable; as such it had permissibly found the threshold for a costs award was met. As for the Claimant’s objection to the amount of the award (the entirety of the Respondents’ costs, subject to detailed assessment), the ET: (i) was entitled to find that the change in the Claimant’s case had an effect on the entire proceedings, and (ii) had drawn inferences that were open to it on its findings as to the conduct of the Claimant’s case, such that it had permissibly taken into account the resources of those who had supported the litigation for their own purposes. As for the order restricting the future publication of all hearing documents, that had been a decision open to the ET under its powers of case management. It had had due regard to the open justice principle and been entitled to exercise its discretion in the way that it had.

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Equal Pay: Identification of decision-maker is not essential to material factor defence

In Scottish Water v Edgar [2024] EAT 32, the Claimant brought an equal pay claim under the Equality Act, 2010. Her comparator was a male employee with the same job title and within the same pay band who had been appointed after her. The Appellant raised a ‘material factor defence’ (i.e. the employer is able to give a genuine reason for the difference in pay between the Claimant and their comparator that is not related to gender) that the difference in pay was due to the comparator’s superior skills, experience and potential. The Appellant led evidence about discussions within its organisation about those matters and about the resultant level of salary ultimately offered to the comparator at the time of his appointment. It also sought to lead comparative evidence of the Claimant’s skills, experience and potential both at the time of and after his appointment.

The Employment Tribunal (ET) directed itself that the Appellant required to prove the identity of the pay decision-maker at the point in time when the comparator was engaged. It concluded that the Appellant had not done so, and that the material factor defence accordingly failed. It also directed itself that comparative evidence of the respective skills, experience and potential of the Claimant and the comparator in a period of time after the comparator’s appointment was irrelevant.

The EAT held that:

  • an employer does not need to prove the identity of the decision-maker in order to establish a material factor defence to an equal pay claim, and
  • comparative evidence of the respective skills and abilities of the claimant and the comparator from a period in time after the comparator’s appointment is not necessarily irrelevant to the employer’s defence, according to the EAT.

The ET’s judgment was set aside and the preliminary issue was remitted to a differently constituted tribunal. It was observed that the primary purpose of the reasons section of any decision of an ET should be to explain to the parties clearly and concisely why the tribunal reached its decision.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law General Update – November 2023

  • Employment,

  • 22nd November 2023

Employment Law

This month’s employment law updates cover various critical issues. The Work and Pensions Committee seeks input on statutory sick pay, while the Government has published its response to the EU employment law consultations. The Home Office updates illegal working penalty guidelines, and we have Government guidance on the handling labour unions before strikes. The TUC’s data on the disability pay gap underscores the importance of inclusivity, and a WoRC report examines systemic factors in the exploitation of migrant workers. Stay informed for compliance in this evolving employment landscape.

  • Sick Pay: Work and Pensions Committee publishes call for evidence on statutory sick pay
  • Retained EU Employment Law: Government response to consultation and new draft regulations available
  • Immigration: Home Office publishes updated code of practice on illegal working penalties
  • Trade Unions: Government publishes guidance on issuing work notices ahead of strike action
  • Disability: TUC publishes latest data on disability pay gap
  • Immigration: WoRC report looks at systemic drivers of UK migrant worker exploitation

 Sick Pay: Work and Pensions Committee publishes call for evidence on statutory sick pay

The Work and Pensions Committee has issued a call for evidence on statutory sick pay (SSP), requesting the public views and ability to submit evidence until Friday, 8 December 2023. The Work and Pensions Select Committee calls for this inquiry to assess the existing ‘effectiveness of SSP in supporting claimants and if SSP should be reformed to better enable a recipient’s recovery and return to work’.

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Retained EU Employment Law: Government response to consultation and new draft regulations available

Retained EU Employment Law consultation response

The government has officially released its response to the ‘Retained EU Employment Law’ consultation, addressing proposed reforms within the Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTR) related to annual leave, holiday pay calculations, and record-keeping requirements. Additionally, it responded to the consultation concerning the annual leave entitlement calculation for part-year and irregular hours workers in light of the Supreme Court’s Harpur Trust v Brazel 2022 ICR 1380 decision.

The government has proposed the introduction of a ‘rolled-up’ holiday pay system for irregular hours and part-year workers and allow for an annual leave accrual method of 12.07% of hours worked for these groups. This means that instead of receiving a separate payment when taking annual leave, certain workers, specifically those with irregular hours or part-year employment (which may include agency workers), will get an extra amount added to their regular pay.

However, the government has decided not to proceed with the idea of creating a single annual leave entitlement that combines the ‘basic’ and ‘additional’ annual leave entitlements into a single 5.6-week entitlement (i.e. four weeks required by EU law and the 1.6 weeks mandated by the Working Time Regulations). Instead, they want to maintain two separate “pots” of annual leave with two different pay rates. This means that workers will still receive four weeks of leave at their normal pay rate and 1.6 weeks at a basic pay rate.

Additionally, the government plans to pass laws to make it clearer what should be included in the calculation of normal remuneration for holiday pay. They are also considering more significant changes to how holiday pay rates are determined.

In response to the Harpur Trust ruling, the initial proposal suggested using a 52-week reference period to calculate annual leave entitlement. However, many people raised concerns about the extra work this would create and the challenges it posed for workers whose hours changed from year to year or for those in their first year of employment.

To keep things simpler, the government has opted for a different approach. They will use an accrual method to figure out annual leave entitlement, where workers get 12.07% of the hours they’ve worked in a specific pay period. This method was commonly used before the Harpur Trust decision and better reflects the hours a worker has actually worked in the current year. For other workers in their first year of employment, things will remain the same. They will continue to accrue annual leave by receiving 1/12th of their statutory entitlement on the first day of each month and adjusting it accordingly.

The response also mentions that the government will maintain certain EU case laws to protect workers’ rights regarding carrying over unused annual leave when they can’t take it due to maternity, family-related leave, or being sick. They will also introduce a way for irregular hours and part-year workers to accrue annual leave when they’ve had periods of maternity, family-related leave, or sickness.

Additionally, the government will proceed with changes to record-keeping requirements in the Working Time Regulations (WTR). This change clarifies that businesses do not have to keep daily records of how many hours each worker works. This clarification aims to address concerns that a previous ruling by the European Court of Justice might have required employers to track the exact daily hours worked by each employee, rather than maintaining adequate and proportionate records based on the workplace and working patterns.

Regarding TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings), the government will move forward with its proposal to simplify consultation obligations during a transfer. Small businesses (with fewer than 50 employees) will be allowed to directly consult with employees if there are no existing employee representatives, avoiding the need to organize elections for new representatives. Additionally, businesses of any size can directly consult with employees (if there are no existing representatives) when a transfer involves fewer than ten employees.Top of Form

Draft Regulations

The Department of Business and Trade has published the draft Equality Act 2010 (Amendment) Regulations 2023. The draft SI restates some protections in relation to pregnancy, maternity and breastfeeding, indirect discrimination, access to employment and occupation, equal pay and the definition of disability which would otherwise be lost from 1 January 2024 under the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 (REUL(RR)A 2023).

These draft regulations are proposed to reproduce in domestic law certain interpretive effects of retained EU law which, under REUL(RR)A 2023, will cease to apply to the UK statute book after the end of 2023. This will mean that, in the areas covered by this instrument, the law will continue to have the same effect after the end of 2023 as it did before. They are due to come into force on 1 January 2024.

The draft Employment Rights (Amendment, Revocation and Transitional Provision) Regulations 2023 will amend the Working Time Regulations 1998 (in relation to record-keeping, paid holiday for irregular hours workers and part-year workers, normal pay, and the carrying forward of paid holiday) and the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (in relation to information and consultation obligations on small businesses for transfers on or after 1 July 2024) and revoke the European Cooperative Society (Involvement of Employees) Regulations 2006. They are due to come into force on 1 January 2024.

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Immigration: Home Office publishes updated code of practice on illegal working penalties

The Home Office has published a new draft Code of Practice on the civil penalty schemes for employers (preventing illegal working). The draft is an update to the version published in March 2022 and will be the sixth version of the code. This latest version of the code will be applied to all right to work checks from 22 January 2024 including where a follow-up check is required to maintain a statutory excuse, even if the initial check was undertaken using a previous version of the code which was current at the time.

The draft code has been amended further to the issue of draft Statutory Instruments (SIs) which will raise the starting point for penalties to £45,000 for a breach (if there are no previous breaches in the last three years) and £60,000 for repeated breaches. The draft codes will come into force at the same time as the related SIs, which are: (Employment of Adults Subject to Immigration Control) (Maximum Penalty) (Amendment) Order 2023 and the Immigration (Restrictions on Employment and Residential Accommodation) (Codes of Practice) (Amendment) Order 2023. These are each stated to come into force on 22 January 2024, or, if later, on the twenty-first day after the day on which it is made. However, the code assumes 22 January 2024 as a commencement date.

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Trade Unions: Government publishes guidance on issuing work notices ahead of strike action

The Department of Business and Trade has published guidance for employers, trade unions and workers on issuing work notices ahead of strike action. Work notices, which were introduced under the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023, allow employers to require a workforce to meet minimum service levels for an upcoming strike period where the trade union has given notice to the employer of the strike and the employer provides a service covered by minimum service level regulations.

The new guidance is designed to be read alongside the government’s range of guidance on industrial action which can be found here.

The guidance covers:

  • the purpose of a work notice and the steps for preparing it;
  • considerations when preparing a work notice;
  • considerations upon deciding to issue a work notice;
  • consulting with trade unions;
  • guidance on producing a work notice;
  • guidance on notifying workers of a notice;
  • duties on workers and trade unions following issue of a work notice;
  • data protection issues.

The full guidance can be found here.

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Disability: TUC publishes latest data on disability pay gap

The Trade Union Congress (TUC) has published new analysis [TUC slams “zero progr<a id=”back”></a>ess” on disability pay gap in last decade | TUC] of the pay gap between non-disabled and disabled workers. According to data from the TUC, the pay gap is currently higher than it was 10 years ago, with non-disabled workers earning approximately 14.6% more than disabled workers.

The key findings of the analysis include:

  • the pay gap is only marginally lower than it was when the TUC launched disability Pay Gap Day in 2016/17;
  • disabled women face the biggest pay penalty with non-disabled men earning an average of 30% more;
  • the industry with the biggest pay gap is financial and industrial services which currently stands at 33.2%;
  • disabled workers are twice as likely to be unemployed than non-disabled workers;
  • one in 10 BME disabled workers are unemployed compared to nearly one in 40 white non-disabled workers;
  • disabled workers are more likely to be on zero-hours contracts than non-disabled workers.

The TUC has called for action from the government to put an end to discrimination against disabled workers in the labour market and has backed Labour’s New Deal for Working People.

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Immigration: WoRC report looks at systemic drivers of UK migrant worker exploitation

The charity Work Rights Centre (WoRC) has published a report which looks at what lies behind increasing reports of migrant worker exploitation in the UK, particularly in certain sectors such as health and care. Drawing on 40 case studies, interviews with caseworkers, and policy analysis, the report identifies the post-Brexit work sponsorship system and piecemeal/weak labour enforcement as two key systemic drivers. It makes a number of recommendations, including reforms to the work sponsorship system (replacing employer sponsorship entirely, or alternatively a range of reforms to the sponsorship system to facilitate protection of sponsored migrants against exploitation), increasing protections for all workers (including establishing a Single Enforcement Body for all labour rights, giving protection against unfair dismissal from the first day of employment and instituting secure reporting of exploitative practices), and implementing a migrant worker welfare strategy (including the creation of an independent Migrant Commissioner role).

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – September 2023

  • Employment,

  • 21st September 2023

Employment Law

This month we bring you a plethora of interesting cases centring around dismissal in all its forms – be they agreed, part of a restructure or initiated for a reason. The questions will always be: is that reason fair and/or have you followed the correct procedure? Have a look at our case run down here.

  • TUPE: Employment decision on when a TUPE transfer takes place
  • Redundancy: Employees in restructure did not unreasonably refuse suitable employment
  • Unfair Dismissal: Conclusion on the fairness of a dismissal must be based on the established reason for that dismissal
  • Sex Discrimination: Tribunal’s misstatement of grievance outcome materially impacted on its consideration of the claim

TUPE: Employment decision on when a TUPE transfer takes place

In Rajput v Commerzbank and Société Générale [2023] EAT 116 the EAT held that (i) in a ‘series of transactions’ cases, the transfer does not necessarily take place at the end of the series, and (ii) when determining the date of the transfer, a tribunal can have regard to matters which occur outside the UK. Regulation 3(1)(a), which provides that the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE 2006), SI 2006/246 apply to undertakings which are ‘situated immediately before the transfer in the UK’, does not mean that a tribunal must focus solely on events which take place within the UK-businesses which are situated in the UK.

Sarah Clarke, barrister at 3PB, who represented the claimant in this appeal, writes in a case analysis for Lexis Nexis that, on the face of it, the EAT’s finding that a transfer can take place at any point within the ‘series of transactions’ could cause uncertainty and increase the amount of litigation in this area. However, she goes on to say that she considers that, in the vast majority of cases, a transfer will take place at the end of the series. The question to be determined is when responsibility for the carrying on of the business transfers to the transferee and it is difficult to envisage many situations in which responsibility would transfer over prior to the end of the transactions. Indeed, as a matter of logic, if a transfer is ‘effected’ by a series of transactions, it cannot be until the last of those transactions that the transfer is complete, as otherwise the later transactions could not have ‘effected’ the transfer. However, this argument was rejected by the EAT and, in her view, there is scope for further judicial consideration of this.

In relation to the location of the business, this case makes it clear that, when determining when a transfer takes place, a tribunal’s focus ought not to be solely on those matters which occur in the UK. The relevance of geography to TUPE is simply that the business must be situated in the UK immediately before the transfer takes place. However, this does not preclude the business operating from other locations outside the UK. Thus, when dealing with this issue, parties must ensure that they provide evidence to the tribunal which clearly explains all matters relevant to the transfer, regardless as to where in the world those events took place.

The claimant was employed by Commerzbank (CB) from 2012 as a senior compliance officer. She was dismissed in March 2020 and brought various claims, including automatic unfair dismissal (on the basis that the sole or principal reason for her dismissal was the TUPE transfer) and victimisation (following a previous successful discrimination claim she had brought against CB). She had worked within the Equity Markets and Commodities Division (EMC) of the business, which was sold to Société Générale (SG), following a business purchase agreement which was signed in November 2018.

The EMC business was divided into three divisions, namely Flow Trading, Asset Management (AM) and Exotics, Vanilla and Funds (EVF), and was spread across several countries, including the UK, Luxembourg and Germany. The claimant worked across all three divisions.

For the purpose of the business sale, each division was (i) allocated its own purchase price, and (ii) divided into sub-batches, which transferred over a period of time. The EVF division transferred over in six batches from March to October 2019, with AM transferring over from May to November 2019. The last part of the EMC business to transfer over was Flow. It was based mainly in Germany, with only a small presence in London consisting of five employees. Most of Flow had transferred over by March 2020, with the remainder transferring in May 2020.

The employment tribunal found that the transfer took place on 1 October 2019 on the basis that 95% of the UK operation had transferred over by then. The judge thus ignored the last division which transferred over, as this was based predominantly in Germany.

The EAT, Mr Justice Kerr sitting alone, concluded that:

‘…there is no presumption or rule that a transfer effected by a series of transactions occurs at the end of the series. Completion may be artificially delayed. The last transaction in the series may be a minor detail, putting the last piece of the jigsaw in place long after the transferee has started running the business to the exclusion of the transferor.’

However, he agreed that the judge had erred in excluding from his consideration the Flow part of the business. The question to be determined was when responsibility for the carrying on of the business was transferred to the transferee (CELTEC v Astley). It was an agreed fact that Flow formed ‘part of the organised grouping of resources’ which comprised the EMC business. There was no reason why an ‘organised grouping of resources’ (in the words of TUPE 2006, SI 2006/246, reg 3(2)) could not be located across several countries at once. A business or part of a business can be ‘situated’ in the UK without its entire operation being located in the UK. He concluded that ‘there is nothing in the TUPE Regulations that required the tribunal to confine its consideration to the part of the organised grouping of resources based in this country.’

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Redundancy: Employees in restructure did not unreasonably refuse suitable employment 

In Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust v Stevenson [2023] EAT 115 the EAT had to consider whether the respondent had been entitled to refuse to make redundancy payments to the claimants where the employment tribunal had held that the alternative roles offered to them were ‘suitable’ but that their rejection of them was not unreasonable due to their personal perceptions of those roles.

The EAT held that there was no error in the employment tribunal’s approach:

— the relevant statutory test is whether the claimants ‘unreasonably’ refused an offer of employment that was suitable to them (the suitability of the role is not in and of itself determinative)

— even though the claimants’ perception of the roles was objectively groundless, the employment judge had found that there was a sufficient basis for their personal perceptions of the roles (eg that they would be a loss of autonomy and status) for them not to have acted unreasonably in refusing them

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Unfair Dismissal: Direct Line beats claims advisers case over agreed exit

Insurer Direct Line has successfully defended a case by a claims adviser that it unfairly dismissed him, with the EAT ruling that the employment tribunal had been entitled to find that there was no dismissal because the employee had mutually agreed to terminate his employment after his mental health problems meant he could not work.

In Riley v Direct Line Insurance Group plc [2023] EAT 118, the EAT ruled that an employment tribunal was entitled to find that Matthew Riley had consented to leaving his job. This is because he knew that he would receive lifetime insurance payments after being left unable to work due to mental health problems stemming from autistic spectrum disorder.

His Honour Judge (HHJ) Murray Shanks said the employment tribunal did not err when it rejected Riley’s case that he was duped into terminating his employment. ‘There was ample evidence for the conclusion reached, and the tribunal considered in detail whether Mr Riley’s consent was freely given’, he said. HHJ Shanks added that the tribunal ‘went to considerable lengths to emphasise their conclusions that Mr Riley was not tricked or coerced in any way and that he participated in the discussions, was given time and fully understood what he was doing’.

Riley was absent from work from 2014 until October 2017 due to anxiety and depression, according to the judgment. He began to make a phased return—but was again left unable to work from May 2018 because of anxiety and paranoia, the judgment says. He met with managers in August 2018 and September 2018, when he discussed leaving the job and relying on an insurance policy with UNUM that would make payments equating to 80% of his salary until he reached retirement age, according to the judgment.

Direct Line notified Riley in September 2018 that he was being dismissed following a meeting at which UNUM confirmed that he would be entitled to the benefits of the policy, the judgment says. Riley launched a case at the employment tribunal later that year, lodging claims of unfair dismissal and disability discrimination over allegations that he had been tricked by managers, according to the judgment.

But the tribunal dismissed his case in 2019, rejecting Riley’s evidence that he was put under pressure and did not understand what he was being told by managers. It also found that Riley had told managers that he knew terminating his employment to rely on the insurance policy was ‘where it’s been heading for the last four years’, according to the appeal judgment. The tribunal also concluded that Riley’s discussions with managers about his leaving had been supportive and designed to help him make the right decision.

John Platts-Mills, of Devereux Chambers, Riley’s counsel, argued before the EAT that the tribunal had failed to address the questions of who really terminated their client’s employment and whether the claims adviser really gave ‘true, mutual consent’, according to the appeal judgment.

But HHJ Shanks rejected the argument, ruling that the tribunal had ‘considered evidence relating to this in detail’. ‘It is true that they did not expressly refer to his disability in this context, but they must have had it well in mind when they rejected his evidence that he did not understand what was being said at meetings and found that he had made a fully informed decision’, he said.

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Unfair Dismissal: Conclusion on the fairness of a dismissal must be based on the established reason for that dismissal

In Greater Glasgow Health Board v Mullen [2023] EAT 122, the EAT dismissed the employer’s appeal against the decision of the employment tribunal which found that the employer’s reason for dismissing their employee was a belief by it in the existence of misconduct consisting of aggressive and threatening behaviour by him to one of his line reports. The tribunal further concluded that the employer’s belief in the existence of that misconduct was genuinely held and reached after reasonable investigation. The issue was whether the tribunal had erred in their decision.

The EAT held, among other things, that: (i) in the circumstances it was not open to the employment tribunal to base its conclusion about the fairness of the dismissal in terms of section 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 on a factual hypothesis that the ‘real reason’ for the dismissal was something different to the established reason; and (ii) on the findings in fact made by the employment tribunal, the only conclusion to which they could properly have come was that dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses open to the employer and was fair. Consequently, the employment tribunal’s judgment was set aside, and the claim of unfair dismissal was dismissed.

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Vicarious Liability: School not liable for acts of work experience student

In MXX v A Secondary School [2022] EWHC 2207 (QB) the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision that the defendant, a co-educational secondary school providing education for children aged 11 to 16, was not vicariously liable for the sexual assaults carried out by PXM on the claimant (a pupil), subsequent to PXM undertaking a work experience placement at the school. The court held that the judge had been wrong to have found that the relationship between the defendant and PXM was not akin to employment but that:

— given the limited nature of PXM’s role during the course of one week (eg he had no pastoral responsibility), the facts did not begin to satisfy the requirements of the close connection test

— the grooming which led to the sexual offending was not inextricably woven with the carrying out by PXM of his work during his week at the defendant’s school such that it would be fair and just to hold the defendant vicariously liable for the acts of PXM.

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Disability Discrimination: Tribunal rules insurer discriminated against menopausal worker

A British insurance company has been ordered to pay one of its former workers £64,645 after the tribunal found it failed to make reasonable adjustments for an employee with menopausal symptoms, who later resigned.

In Lynskey v Direct Line Insurance Services Ltd ET/1802204/2022 and ET/1802386/2022, Employment Judge Wade found that Direct Line Insurance Services Ltd did not fully consider the impact of menopause on Maxine Lynskey when it launched a warning and disciplinary process based on her performance. ‘At that time the disadvantage the claimant faced in doing her job while struggling with menopausal symptoms ought to have been recognised as such and adjustments made’, Judge Wade wrote.

The insurer must pay the sum to Lynskey to account for a range of factors, including damages for injury to feelings as well as losses she suffered, according to a remedy judgment. These events are a ‘serious and sustained number of contraventions over a period involving both the claimant’s line manager and her line managers and HR’, the tribunal found.

Lynskey was a motor sales consultant for Direct Line from April 2016. She had ‘very good’ performance ratings in that role. She then informed her manager at a meeting she was having health issues related to menopause.

‘It was clear from the information the claimant provided that she was being profoundly affected by menopausal symptoms and was seeking treatment for them; that was apparent from March 2020’, Judge Wade wrote.

Lynskey then moved to a different team considered to be a ‘better fit’ in light of her personal and health circumstances, albeit one that did not involve a sales related bonus. However, the tribunal found that with this new role, Lynskey’s managers should have been aware of health issues that would affect her performance. ‘The respondent knew, or ought reasonably to have known, from March 2020, that the claimant had become a disabled person by reason of menopausal symptoms’, Judge Wade wrote. ‘She was self-evidently at a disadvantage in comparison with colleagues without her disability in meeting the respondent’s performance standards and targets, and generally more likely to be sanctioned or face disciplinary/performance warnings.’

Lynskey began underperforming, and was told she wouldn’t receive a pay rise because her performance was rated ‘need for improvement’, the judge wrote. The tribunal ruled that it was unfavourable treatment to score her performance without fully factoring in her disability. ‘Need for improvement is inherently unfavourable if the person, through disability, cannot, in fact, improve, or meet the required standards’, it said. She later faced a warning meeting where her manager ‘failed to recognise or take in the explanations’ around her symptoms. Lynskey then faced a disciplinary meeting where her health condition was not fully considered. Judge Wade found that the subsequent disciplinary warning ‘was unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of disability’.

‘It is clear a less discriminatory approach could have been taken, including occupational health referral, consideration of other roles, and accepting the claimant’s mitigation, namely her disability’, the judge wrote.

After a period of ill health and personal issues outside work, Lynskey’s sick pay was stopped, the ruling said. She then submitted a grievance to her employer before ultimately resigning in May 2022, then brought constructive unfair dismissal and Equality Act 2010 complaints against the insurance company.

The tribunal upheld Lynskey’s arguments that Direct Line failed to make reasonable adjustments for her, as well as her complaints about discrimination because of her menopause symptoms. It rejected her complaints relating to constructive unfair dismissal, sex and age.

The tribunal handed down an extempore judgment (given verbally at the end of the case, not written down) on 28 April 2023, and Direct Line requested the written reasons, which were published on 25 August 2023.

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Sex Discrimination: Tribunal’s misstatement of grievance outcome materially impacted on its consideration of the claim

In Iourin v The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford [2023] EAT 108 the EAT considered a number of appeals against an employment tribunal’s decision dismissing the claimant’s claims for direct sex discrimination, victimisation, and disability discrimination against the respondent under the Equality Act 2010.

The claimant had attempted to hug and kiss a colleague when they were in a car together. She raised a grievance and the grievance committee held that this conduct was unwanted but that, in the context of their relationship, it did not amount to harassment or sexual harassment. The claimant was however required to undergo training related to harassment, which he claimed was sex discrimination.

In finding that this did not amount to sex discrimination, the employment tribunal had made a material error of law by relying on its mistaken account of the grievance committee’s finding—stating that it was harassment but not sexual harassment—in reaching its conclusion that this was the non-discriminatory reason for the training requirement. That claim was therefore remitted to the employment tribunal for rehearing.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com.

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – July 2023

  • Employment,

  • 25th July 2023

Employment Law

A round-up of the most significant employment law cases to be published over the last month, and it’s a varied bag. We look at what lead to an interim injunction before a disciplinary hearing, whether it was lawful for the government to revoke legislation without consultation, whether a person can have two employers at the same time for the same work, whether a dismissal meeting is always needed to ensure a fair process and how a lay tribunal member could be considered to have been biased.

  • Injunctions: Witnesses and disclosure of documents at disciplinary hearings
  • Strikes: Could the government revoke legislation to prevent strikers being replaced by agency staff?
  • Worker Status: Can a person have two different employers at the same time for the same work?
  • Unfair Dismissal: Lack of dismissal meeting does not render dismissal unfair
  • Tribunals: Apparent bias in case of lay member posting on social media

Injunctions: Witnesses and disclosure of documents at disciplinary hearings

In Colbert v Royal United Hospitals Bath NHS Foundation Trust [2023] EWHC 1672 (KB), the Claimant, Dr Serryth Colbert, was a consultant in oral and maxillofacial surgery, employed by the Defendant, the Royal United Hospitals Bath NHS Foundation Trust. The Claimant was the subject of disciplinary proceedings brought by the Defendant following allegations that he intimidated and bullied colleagues and other allegations of misconduct. The Claimant issued proceedings on 30 May 2023 seeking an interim injunction relating to the conduct by the Defendant of the disciplinary process.

This case involved two issues in dispute: 1) whether the Claimant had a right to require the attendance of individuals at a disciplinary hearing, who were interviewed as part of the investigation of allegations against him, but who the Defendant was not proposing to call to give evidence, and 2) whether the Claimant was entitled to disclosure of specific documents as part of the disciplinary process, and in particular to an unredacted report that had been produced into alleged misconduct in his department. The Claimant claimed that the way the Defendant had dealt with those two matters breached express contractual obligations, contained in two documents which he contended formed part of his contract: (1) “Maintaining High Professional Standards in the Modern NHS” (“MHPS”) published by the Department of Health; and (2) “Managing Conduct Policy” (“MCP”), the Defendant’s policy for dealing with allegations of misconduct.

In December 2020, the Defendant commissioned an external review to examine the department in which the Claimant worked following allegations having been raised of inappropriate workplace behaviour. A report was produced in February 2021 (“the Atkinson Report”) by the external reviewer, and considered the behaviour of a number of individuals, including the Claimant, and made recommendations, one of which was that the Claimant should be investigated for alleged bullying / inappropriate behaviour. The Claimant was excluded from work from 8 March 2021 while an investigation was carried out (conducted pursuant to the MHPS). An external report was commissioned involving the interviewing of 21 witnesses, including the claimant, and a further report submitted in December 2021 (“the Cunningham Report”). The Report made a number of critical findings about the Claimant including that he had displayed intimidating and bullying behaviour towards a number of colleagues.

On 16 December 2021 a letter was sent to the Claimant with the outcome of the investigation, concluding that the Claimant had a case to answer in relation to a series of allegations, and that the matter would proceed to a disciplinary panel, to be held in January 2023, in accordance with the Defendant’s MCP. The letter stated who would be called as witnesses for the Defendant and who else would be giving evidence, and invited the Claimant to identify who he would be calling, and enclosed a number of documents including the Cunningham Report and a redacted copy of the Atkinson Report (the redactions relating to the other individuals identified by the report).

In January the Claimant wrote back to state the Claimant required that 11 named individuals, described as “management witnesses”, should be present so they could be questioned, and that the Claimant intended to call “around 30 additional witnesses subject to their availability”, and asked for the hearing date to be rescheduled. The Defendant responded by acceding to a later hearing date (May) but declined to provide the 11 witnesses, other than Ms Cunningham who had prepared the second report, and said that he had received all the relevant documents, and the redacted parts of the Atkinson report related only to other members of staff and were not relevant to this investigation.

The Claimant sent a letter before claim setting out:

1. Grounds: The alleged Breaches of Contract by the Defendants are the failure to follow its disciplinary procedures, and to hold a disciplinary hearing in accordance with the Claimant’s contractual rights. These rights are confirmed in the doctor’s employment contract, in [the MHPS] and in the [MCP].

2. The failure to require the Defendant’s primary witnesses to attend the disciplinary hearing so that they can be cross examined by the Claimant’s chosen representative.

3. The failure to allow the Claimant to bring his chosen representative to represent him at the hearing in breach of the amended procedure.

4. The failure to disclose documents pertaining to the disciplinary case in line with MHPS.

The Defendant declined to agree and due to the tight schedule that the letters had caused prior to the rescheduled May disciplinary hearing, the Claimant issued an interim injunction for breach of the Claimant’s contract – the order sought to ensure un-redacted disclosure of all documents, to ensure that all the Defendant’s management witnesses attend the disciplinary hearing and the Claimant’s chosen representative was allowed to represent him at the disciplinary hearing and conduct cross-examination.

In the High Court, (King’s Bench Division) the judge held that, on the correct reading of the Defendant employer’s policy for dealing with allegations of misconduct (the MCP), the employee did not have an unqualified right to insist that any ‘management witness’ could be required to attend a disciplinary hearing to be cross-examined. Accordingly, the court dismissed the employee’s application for an interim injunction. The employee had sought the injunction to ensure unredacted disclosure of all documents, and to ensure that all the defendant’s management witnesses attended the disciplinary hearing, so that they could be cross-examined, and he had contended that the employer had breached express contractual obligations.

The court held that there was no serious issue to be tried, because: (i) the claimant had no real prospect of establishing that his interpretation of the relevant paragraph of the MCP (namely that it meant that the employer had to ensure the attendance at any rescheduled disciplinary hearing of all management witnesses, so that they can be subject to cross examination) was correct; and (ii) there was a good argument that the proceedings should run their course before it would be appropriate for the court to intervene, in circumstances where it was settled law that courts should not become involved in the ‘micromanagement’ of disciplinary proceedings. Further, the court held that the employee had no real prospect of establishing that an investigative report that a Trust had commissioned into a department at a hospital constituted ‘correspondence’, as the word was ordinarily understood or as it was intended to be used in the MHPS. Moreover, there was no real prospect of his establishing that ‘relevant’ material had been withheld from the employee and, even if the report amounted to correspondence, he would not have an unqualified right to have the unredacted report disclosed to him.

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Strikes: Could the government revoke legislation to prevent strikers being replaced by agency staff?

In R (on the application of ASLEF and others) v Secretary of State for Business and Trade [2023] EWHC 1781 (Admin) the High Court considered whether it was lawful for the government, without consultation, to revoke legislation which prevented workers on strike being replaced by agency workers. From 1976 it was unlawful for an employment business knowingly to introduce or supply workers to an employer to carry out the work of employees who were taking part in official industrial action. Regulations made pursuant to section 5 of the Employment Agencies Act 1973 and most recently regulation 7 of the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3319 – “the 2003 Regulations”), made this a criminal offence.

In 2015, the Government conducted a public consultation on a proposal to revoke regulation 7. The majority of the responses did not favour this change in the law and, in 2016, it was decided not to go ahead. In June 2022, however, the Government decided, in the context of industrial action in the rail sector and other anticipated industrial action, that regulation 7 would be revoked without further public consultation. On 27 June 2022, the draft Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/852 – “the 2022 Regulations”) were therefore laid before Parliament, regulation 2(a) of which implemented this measure. The 2022 Regulations were made by the then Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (“BEIS”), Mr Kwasi Kwarteng, on 20 July 2022 and they came into effect on 21 July 2022.

Thirteen trade unions challenged the then Secretary of State’s decision to make the 2022 Regulations. The challenge is on two grounds:

  1. that he failed to comply with his statutory duty, under section 12(2) of the 1973 Act, to consult before making the 2022 Regulations (“Ground 1”).
  2. it is contended that, by making the 2022 Regulations, the Secretary of State breached his duty, under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), to prevent unlawful interference with the rights of trade unions and their members (“Ground 2”).

The High Court confirmed that the challenge succeeded on the basis of Ground 1 and quashed the Regulations. In particular, it found that the decision to revoke the legislation preventing the use of agency workers in place of striking workers “was not informed by, or tested against, the views of and the evidence of bodies which were representative of the interests concerned”. The Secretary of State could not rely upon consultation which had taken place 7 years earlier on the same point (and was found not to have done so in any event).

The High Court, having upheld Ground 1, decided not to express a view on the more contentious Ground 2.

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Worker Status: Can a person have two different employers at the same time for the same work?

In United Taxis Ltd v Comolly [2023] EAT 93,  the EAT considered Mr Comolly’s worker status. He is a taxi driver, registered with United Taxis and who then did work driving United Taxis’ passengers, through one of its shareholders, Mr Parkinson, using his taxi.  After that relationship came to an end he did work driving United Taxis’ passengers, through another shareholder, Mr Tidman, using his taxi.  After that relationship ended he brought various complaints to the employment tribunal asserting that he was either an employee or a worker of United Taxis or Mr Tidman.

The tribunal determined as preliminary issues that Mr Comolly was a worker of United Taxis and an employee of Mr Tidman. On the facts found, the tribunal properly concluded that United Taxis’ passengers’ contracts were, and were solely, with United Taxis. It also properly concluded that, under Mr Comolly’s contract with Mr Tidman, Mr Comolly provided services to him in exchange for payment.  United Taxis contracted out the task of conveying its passengers to Mr Tidman, who in turn sub-contracted it to Mr Comolly. 

However, the EAT noted that the key cases of Brook Street Bureau v Dacas and Cable & Wireless v Muscat had found the concept of dual employment to be “problematic” and concluded that it could not “see how [the problems] could be overcome”. It therefore found that the tribunal erred in finding that Mr Tidman had a contract with United Taxis under which he also did work for it.  There was no necessity to imply such a contract, whether from the fact that he registered with United Taxis, and was required to comply with its rules and byelaws as a condition of being permitted to convey its passengers, or otherwise.  The tribunal could also not properly find that he was simultaneously an employee or worker of two employers in respect of the same work.

The tribunal also erred in finding that Mr Comolly’s contract with Mr Tidman was a contract of employment, in particular in its approach to the question of control. In particular, although Mr Tidman controlled when the taxi was available to Mr Comolly, he had no control over what Mr Comolly did during the time that the taxi was available to him. Drawing on its findings of fact, a finding was substituted that Mr Comolly was a worker of Mr Tidman.

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Unfair Dismissal: Lack of dismissal meeting does not render dismissal unfair

In Charalambous v National Bank of Greece [2023] EAT 75, the EAT considered the process of dismissal. It found that the lack of a meeting between an employee and the dismissing officer will not in and of itself, in all circumstances, make a dismissal unfair. It found that the decision in Budgen & Co v Thomas [1976] ICR 344 (EAT), was not an authority for the proposition that a dismissing officer must always have direct communication with an employee in order for a misconduct dismissal to be fair. Such a meeting is desirable and good practice but what is essential is that the employee is given the opportunity to ‘say whatever he or she wishes to say’ and there is nothing to say that this communication cannot, in principle, be in writing or by way of a report to the dismissing officer, according to the EAT. In any event, the Employment Tribunal had looked at the procedure adopted by the respondent as a whole: it found that any procedural unfairness in the initial decision to dismiss was sufficiently addressed by the internal appeal, which involved a meeting between the claimant and the decision-maker. The claimant’s appeal against the Employment Tribunal’s finding that her dismissal for misconduct had been fair was therefore dismissed.

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Tribunals: Apparent bias in case of lay member posting on social media

In Aspect Windows (Western) Limited V Retter (as representative of the estate of Mrs C McCrorie) [2023] EAT 95 following the publishing of the decision of the employment tribunal arising from a full merits hearing, one of the lay members of the tribunal posted on her LinkedIn page, a link to a report about the decision in the Mail Online. Followers of hers then responded on LinkedIn and she responded to them.

The unsuccessful Respondent in the employment tribunal appealed on the basis that the LinkedIn posts gave rise to apparent bias against it. The EAT held that whilst it is possible that what a tribunal member said about a case after the event could shed light as to their approach to the hearing of it, the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the contents of these posts and applying the guidance in Magill v Porter [2001] UKHL 67 and other pertinent authorities, would not in the circumstances consider the lay member was biased in favour of the Claimant. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – March 2023

  • Employment,

  • 27th March 2023

Employment Law

A round-up of the most significant employment law cases to be published over the last month regarding unfair dismissal and determining the date the contract was terminated, considering how an employee’s disabilities may have affected his conduct, respecting privacy through restricted reporting at tribunals and a look at how the ICO and Easylife settled a monetary penalty for unlawful data processing.

Unfair Dismissal: Determining the effective date of termination of the contract

In Meaker v Cyxtera Technology UK Ltd [2023] EAT 17 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (the EAT) dismissed the employee’s appeal, concerning the correct approach, in law, to the calculation of the effective date of termination of employment (EDT), pursuant to s.97 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and for the purposes of a complaint of unfair dismissal. The employee appealed after his unfair dismissal claim was struck out as being out of time. The employer argued that the determination of the EDT was not governed by contractual principles and that, where an employee was dismissed in breach of contract, the EDT was the date on which the dismissal was communicated, regardless of whether he accepted it.

The EAT ruled that the employment tribunal (the ET) had not erred in holding that a letter, which the employer had sent to the employee in February 2020, was a termination letter; and that the effective date of termination, for the purposes of the unfair dismissal claim, was the date of receipt of that letter, even if it had been a repudiatory breach that had not been accepted by the claimant at common law. The EAT held that it was not bound to conclude that the meaning of the letter was rendered ambiguous by the fact that the opening paragraph of the relevant settlement agreement had referred to termination being effected by mutual agreement; and that the ET had been entitled to take the view that, even where there had been no mutual agreement, the termination (by the letter) had been clear.

The EAT ruled that there was no sign in the authorities that it was considered that the EDT would only be the date of a repudiatory breach if the contract had, in fact, been brought to an end by the employee accepting that breach. Further, the EAT held that the ET had not erred in holding that the employee had not shown that it had not been reasonably practicable for him to have presented his unfair dismissal complaint in time.

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Disability Discrimination: Determining whether an employee’s disabilities had had an effect on his conduct

In McQueen v General Optical Council [2023] EAT 36, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (the EAT) dismissed the employee’s appeal against the employment tribunal’s (the ET’s) decision, dismissing his claim which alleged unfavourable treatment by the respondent employer because of something arising in consequence of a disability, pursuant to s.15 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010). The employee had dyslexia, some symptoms of Asperger’s Syndrome, neurodiversity and left sided hearing loss, which had caused some difficulties with his interactions in the workplace. The employer, which was the statutory regulator of optometrists and opticians practising in the UK, had employed the employee as a registration officer. The employee had had ‘meltdowns’ at work, which had led to disciplinary proceedings. Subsequently, he had left that employment.

The employee contended that: (i) the ET had misapplied the broad test of causation required where a claim under s.15 was being considered, in that its reasoning had been contrary to the psychiatric and psychological evidence; (ii) the disability did not, necessarily, need to be the sole or even main reason for the ‘something’ that arose in consequence of it; (iii) the employer had, itself, linked the employee’s behaviour to his disabilities; and (iv) in considering whether there had been discrimination of the kind where ‘A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B’s disability’ (EqA 2010 s 15(1)(a)), the ET had failed to appreciate that the words ‘in consequence of’ were, at least, as broad as the ‘because of’ test.

The EAT held that, although it had reservations about the structure and quality of the ET’s decision and reasoning, the ET had not erred in law or principle in the application of s.15 to the facts; and that it had not adopted too strict a test of causation when considering the effects of the employee’s disabilities. The correct reading of the decision was that the ET had found that those effects had not played any part in the conduct that had led to the unfavourable treatment complained of. The EAT held that, once the ET had determined that the employee’s disabilities had not had any effect on his conduct on the occasions in question, the further question whether any unfavourable treatment had been ‘because of’ that conduct had not arisen.

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Restricted Reporting: Anonymity in hearing cases in the tribunals

In A v Choice Support (Formerly MCCH Ltd) [2023] EAT 18, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (the EAT) ruled on the respondent’s application, pursuant to r.19 of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993, SI 1993/2854, to make permanent a temporary restricted reporting order which had been made at the EAT level, pursuant to r.23 of the 1993 Rules, and arising out of s.11 of the Employment Tribunal’s Act 1996 (the Act), and in line with an order made by the employment tribunal (the ET) pursuant to r.50 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations, SI 2013/1237 (r.50) and s.11 of the Act. The application arose in circumstances where the respondent provided support to vulnerable adults, and the employee alleged that an individual (EA), with whom she had worked at the same property, had raped her.

The EAT held that: (i) r.50 set out a much broader discretion beyond s.11 of the Act; (ii) the orders should make specific reference to which elements of s.11 and/or r.50 the relevant decision was applying; (iii) the distinction between anonymity orders and restrictions on reporting should clearly be separate parts of any such order, setting out whether they were made pursuant to the section or on broader grounds; (iv) if there was concern about jigsaw identification, any order should be made in terms which clearly prohibited publication of any particular detail of the case facts which it was thought might lead to identification; and (v) a restricted reporting order should only be made (and made permanent) when a less restrictive order would not suffice.

The EAT held that the employee should remain anonymised, that EA’s rights under art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been engaged and that, as ‘a person affected’, he should be anonymised and that, because of the risk of jigsaw identification, EA’s parents should remain anonymised. Further, the EAT ruled that the anonymisation should be made the subject of a permanent order.

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Data Protection: ICO and Easylife reach agreement regarding monetary penalty

The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has reached an agreement with Easylife Ltd (Easylife) to reduce the monetary penalty notice to £250,000 for breaching the UK General Data Protection Regulation, Retained Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (UK GDPR). Easylife has accepted the ICO’s findings as set out in the monetary penalty notice and has agreed to pay the reduced fine. This follows the ICO’s fine to Easylife on 4 October 2022, where an investigation found that Easylife was making assumptions about customers’ medical conditions, based on their purchase history, to sell further health related products. This was deemed to involve processing of a special category data without a lawful basis, where Easylife has since stopped the unlawful processing of special category data.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com.

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – January 2023

  • Employment,

  • 24th January 2023

Employment Law

We start off the new year with a Court of Appeal decision on whether a worker who declined to go back to work for fear of COVID-19 was unfairly dismissed or not, the first of its kind at this level. We also take a look at two discrimination cases, a Court of Justice of the European Union case about requirements on employers to provide ‘special corrective appliances’ (such as glasses), and a claim for misuse of private information concerning the reasonable expectation of privacy in private WhatsApp messages.

  • COVID-19: First Court of Appeal decision on the application of ERA 1996, s.100(1)(d) to COVID-19 dismissals
  • Discrimination: Whether PCP requiring disabled employee to work full-time had been applied, despite employer having part-time roles
  • Discrimination: Narrow test for marital status discrimination confirmed
  • Health & Safety at Work: Display screen equipment and the provision of spectacles by employers
  • Data Protection: Misuse of private information and abuse of process

COVID-19: First Court of Appeal decision on the application of ERA 1996, s.100(1)(d) to COVID-19 dismissals

In Rodgers v Leeds Laser Cutting [2022] EWCA Civ 1659, the claimant worked for the respondent as a laser operative in a large warehouse-type space about the size of half a football pitch in which usually only five people would be working. Following the first national ‘lockdown’ on 23 March 2020, the respondent told employees that the business would remain open, asked staff to work as normally as possible and stated ‘we are putting measures in place to allow us to work as normal’. Recommendations were made by an external risk assessment covering most of the things which were already in place before it was undertaken. The claimant left work as usual on 27 March 2020, having not made any complaint about his conditions at work. He obtained a self-isolation note until 3 April 2020 due to having a cough. On 29 March 2020, the claimant told his line manager he had to self-isolate because one child was high risk with sicklecell and a 7 month old baby. His manager agreed. Unfortunately, during this period he drove a friend who had broken his leg to hospital and at some point worked in a pub during the lockdown. On 24 April 2020 he found out he’d been dismissed and was sent his P45.

The claimant made a claim for unfair dismissal on the grounds of health and safety. Under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996), s.100(1)(d), any dismissal of an employee will be automatically unfair, if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that, in circumstances of danger which the worker/employee reasonably believed to be serious and imminent and which they could not reasonably have been expected to avert, the employee:

  • left or proposed to leave, or
  • (while the danger persisted) refused to return to

their place of work or any dangerous part of their place of work. ‘Dangers’ in this context are not limited to dangers arising out of the workplace itself, but also cover dangers caused by the behaviour of fellow employees.

The questions that the employment tribunal has to decide in a case under ERA 1996, s.100(1)(d) are:

  • Did the employee believe that there were circumstances of serious and imminent danger at the workplace? If so:
  • Was that belief reasonable? If so:
  • Could they reasonably have averted that danger? If not:
  • Did they leave, or propose to leave or refuse to return to, the workplace, or the relevant part, because of the (perceived) serious and imminent danger? If so:
  • Was that the reason (or principal reason) for the dismissal?

The tribunal rejected the claim for a number of reasons, including that his evidence was inconsistent, his beliefs of serious imminent danger were not supported by his actions (driving his friend to hospital and working in a pub) and not related to his workplace but to the world at large, he had made no complaint about his specific working conditions, and the measures put in place by the employer (if followed) would make the business as safe as possible from infection.

The claimant appealed, arguing that the tribunal had erred in law by concluding that because his belief was one of a serious and imminent danger at large (i.e. in the whole community), his belief that his workplace presented a serious and imminent danger was not objectively reasonable. The Court of Appeal, like the EAT before it, dismissed the appeal because the claimant’s case failed on its own facts. While the coronavirus pandemic could, in principle, give rise to circumstances of danger that an employee could reasonably believe to be serious and imminent, this was not the situation in this particular claimant’s case in respect of his workplace.

The Court of Appeal has confirmed that, on the particular facts of this case, where the employee refused to return to work during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in circumstances where the employer had put in place social distancing in the workplace and other measures like handwashing and face masks, the employment tribunal did not err in law in concluding that the claimant had not reasonably believed that there were circumstances of danger which were serious and imminent, or which could not be reasonably averted, and as result the dismissal was not automatically unfair under section 100(1)(d) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996).

Guidance was given on the interpretation of ERA 1996, s 100(1)(d) including that:

  • it is sufficient that the employee had a (reasonable) belief in the existence of the danger as well as in its seriousness and imminence. They do not also have to prove that objectively such circumstances of danger did in fact exist;
  • the subsection does not apply where the perceived danger arose on the employee’s journey to work. The perceived danger must arise at the workplace. However it does not follow that the danger need be present only at the workplace;
  • while the paradigm case under ERA 1996, s 100 (1)(d) is where a danger arises by reason of some problem with the premises or equipment, there is nothing about the risk of employees infecting each other with a disease that takes it outside the scope of the subsection: the tribunal will have to decide whether on the particular facts of each case it amounts to a serious and imminent danger.

While the outcome of this case ultimately turned on its own particular facts, the judgment is nonetheless of interest because it is the first appeal to reach the Court of Appeal on the application of ERA 1996, s 100(1) to dismissals related to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.

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Discrimination: Whether PCP requiring disabled employee to work full-time had been applied, despite employer having part-time roles

In Davies v EE Ltd [2022] EAT 191, the EAT considered what amounted to a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) for the purposes of a disability discrimination claim relating to an alleged failure to make reasonable adjustments.

The employee, who was employed full-time, relied on two PCPs, which she contended had left her at a substantial disadvantage: (i) a requirement for employees to complete a full-time working pattern of 40 hours per week, with each shift approximately 9½ hours in length, and (ii) a requirement for employees to complete the shifts without agreeing any reduction in hours. The employment tribunal held that because the respondent employed some employees on a part-time basis and had allowed the claimant a phased return to work, neither PCP had been made out on the facts.

The EAT held that the tribunal had erred in law in concluding that the fact that the employer had other staff who worked part-time had meant that a PCP of requiring the employee to work her contracted hours of 40 per week had not been applied to her. Also, the fact that a temporary adjustment had been made during the employee’s phased return to work did not mean that the PCP had ceased to exist.

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Discrimination: Narrow test for marital status discrimination confirmed

In Ellis v Bacon [2022] EAT 188, the EAT considered a matter of two married director/shareholders whose messy divorce impacted the divorcing wife’s income from the company. Another director, Mr Ellis, sided with the husband, Mr Bacon, in relation to the marital dispute and was compliant with him in removing the Mrs Bacon’s directorship, not paying her dividends, reporting her to the police and suspending and dismissing her on spurious grounds. The employment tribunal held that these actions involved less favourable treatment by Mr Ellis against Mrs Bacon because of her marital status as a wife to Mr Bacon. Mr Ellis appealed.

The EAT held that in a claim of direct discrimination because of the protected characteristic of marriage, the employment tribunal must consider whether it was the claimant’s marital status which was the cause of the less favourable treatment and not the fact that they were married to a particular person. Further, an appropriate hypothetical comparator is someone in a close relationship but not married, and the tribunal must consider whether such a person would have been treated differently.

A person directly discriminates against another person where they treat them less favourably than they treat or would treat others, and they do so because of a protected characteristic. Marriage and civil partnership are protected characteristics. A person has the protected characteristic of marriage if the person is married (which includes a person who is married to a person of the same sex); of civil partnership if the person is a civil partner. Note that people who are not married, or not civil partners, do not have this protected characteristic.

Cases on discrimination because of marriage are very rare. This judgment confirms that the test is to be narrowly construed, with the causative reason for the less favourable treatment being the marital status and not:

  • the identity of the spouse, or
  • the closeness of the relationship.

As a result, there seems very limited scope for claimants to bring successful claims in the context of modern society and the legal concept of protection on grounds of marital status looks increasingly like an outdated concept.

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Health & Safety at Work: Display screen equipment and the provision of spectacles by employers

In TJ v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, C-392/21, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that Article 9 of Council Directive 90/270/EEC, on the minimum safety and health requirements for work with display screen equipment, which is implemented in the UK by regulation 5 of the Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992, must be interpreted as follows:

  • there is no requirement for a causal link between display screen work and potential visual difficulties;
  • ‘special corrective appliances’ include spectacles aimed specifically at the correction and prevention of visual difficulties relating to work involving display screen equipment;
  • those ‘special corrective appliances’ are not limited to appliances used exclusively for professional purposes, i.e. they may be used at other times too; and
  • the employer’s obligation to provide the workers concerned with a special corrective appliance may be met by the direct provision of the appliance to the worker by the employer or by reimbursement of the necessary expenses incurred by the worker, but not by the payment of a general salary supplement to the worker.

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Data Protection: Misuse of private information and abuse of process

In FKJ v RVT [2023] EWHC 3 (KB), which concerned a claim for misuse of private information, the court considered the extent to which there can be a reasonable expectation of privacy in private WhatsApp messages found at work, and how such material should be dealt with in the context of ongoing legal proceedings. FKJ brought a claim in the employment tribunal against her former employers on the grounds of sex discrimination, unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal, amid allegations of sexual harassment by the first defendant, RVT. FKJ lost that employment tribunal claim, in large part due to evidence deployed by RVT which consisted of some 18,000 of FKJ’s private WhatsApp messages. Prior to that tribunal hearing, the defendants had come to be in possession of a complete log of messages exchanged between FKJ and both her partner and her best friend, some of which were ‘of the most intimate kind’. FKJ brought a claim for misuse of private information.

While there was some dispute over how RVT came to be in possession of these messages, spanning a period of two years, FKJ only became aware of them being in his possession when she received the defendants’ grounds of resistance in the employment tribunal proceedings. FKJ chose not to seek exclusion of those messages from evidence, or to seek aggravated damages as a result of RVT’s conduct. Instead, FKJ chose to pursue a claim for misuse of private information in the High Court.

RKJ brought a counter claim grounded in the common law torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. RVT also sought to strike out the claim and seek summary judgment on his counterclaim. As a fall back, the defendants sought payment of significant sums into court by FKJ as a condition of the proceedings continuing.

The court gave short shrift to the defendants’ applications, reaching the ‘clear conclusion that they are without merit’. Parts of the applications were ‘not worthy of serious consideration’ and appeared to be ‘an attempt to stifle a claim that the defendants would prefer not to contest on its merits’. Both the strike out and summary judgment applications were dismissed.

[Written by Charlotte Clayson, partner at Trowers & Hamlins LLP, for Lexis+.]

 

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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Employment Law Case Update – June 2022

  • Employment,

  • 28th June 2022

Employment Law

A round-up of the most significant employment law cases to be published over the last month including insights on dismissal cases, using without prejudice letters and when injunctive relief may be sought to enforce a non-compete clause. We also have an interesting case on ethical veganism v legality of actions.

  • Equality Act: Ethical veganism encompassing an obligation to break the law to relieve animal suffering was not a protected belief
  • Unfair Dismissal: Statutory cap should be applied to unfair dismissal compensation after deduction of earlier payments made to employee
  • Constructive Dismissal: Fundamental breach possible even where employer’s actions do not suggest intention to end employment relationship
  • Dismissal: ACAS code applied to discriminatory sham redundancy dismissal
  • Injunctive Relief: Interim enforcement of non-compete clauses
  • Without Prejudice: Without prejudice letter inadmissible despite exaggerated allegations

Equality Act: Ethical veganism encompassing an obligation to break the law to relieve animal suffering was not a protected belief

In Free Miles v The Royal Veterinary College ET/2206733/2020, an employment tribunal has found that a belief in ethical veganism encompassing an obligation to break the law to relieve animal suffering did not amount to a philosophical belief under section 10 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010).

Ms Free Miles was a veterinary nurse employed by the Royal Veterinary College (RVC). In February 2019, she was arrested by police in connection with alleged burglaries by the Animal Liberation Front. The police found a sick turkey at her flat which she said she had rescued. Following her arrest, Ms Free Miles was summarily dismissed by RVC for reasons including that RVC believed she was connected with an animal rights group that endorsed law breaking and that she had participated in activities including trespass and theft.

Ms Free Miles brought an employment tribunal claim against RVC for, among other things, direct and indirect philosophical belief discrimination. She relied on her belief in ethical veganism, arguing that this belief included a moral obligation to take positive action to reduce animal suffering, including trespass on property and removal of animals. By the time of the tribunal hearing, Ms Free Miles had been charged by the police with criminal offences relating to animal rights activities.

The tribunal stated that, had Ms Free Miles’ belief in ethical veganism been limited to the belief that humans should not eat, wear, use for sport, experiment on or profit from animals, it would have had no reservation in concluding that it amounted to a philosophical belief under section 10 of the EqA 2010. It also said that it might have reached the same conclusion had the moral obligation to take positive action to reduce or prevent animal suffering been limited to lawful action.

However, Ms Free Miles’ belief included trespassing on private property and acting in contravention of the law. The tribunal concluded that a belief to take actions that are unlawful and to interfere with the property rights of others could not be worthy of respect in a democratic society, so did not satisfy the fifth element of the test in Grainger Plc v Nicholson [2010] 2 All ER 253. Laws were made by democratically elected representatives and had to be obeyed by all citizens. It was not open to individuals to decide which laws to obey and disobey. Ms Free Miles’ discrimination claims therefore failed.

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Unfair Dismissal: Statutory cap should be applied to unfair dismissal compensation after deduction of earlier payments made to employee

In Dafiaghor-Olomu v Community Integrated Care [2022] EAT 84, the EAT has held that any payments made by an employer to an employee in respect of an unfair dismissal claim must be deducted from the total compensation sum before the statutory cap is applied.

Mrs Dafiaghor-Olomu won an unfair dismissal claim against Community Integrated Care (CIC). She sought re-engagement and compensation. The tribunal refused re-engagement but awarded £46,153.55 in compensation which CIC paid in full. At a second remedies hearing following a successful appeal, the tribunal increased the compensatory award to £128,961.59. The EAT was required to determine whether the statutory cap should be applied after the earlier payment made by CIC was deducted from the sum of £128,961.59 (leaving an outstanding payment of £74,200, being the amount of the statutory cap in place at the relevant time) or whether the statutory cap should be applied to the total award before the earlier payment was deducted (leaving an outstanding payment of £28,046.45). CIC argued for the latter approach, stating that the former would mean it got no credit for the earlier payment and would be penalised for complying with the tribunal’s original order.

The EAT considered the wording of section 124(5) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. It felt that this showed that Parliament’s intention was for the tribunal to calculate the total compensation due to the employee and then subtract from it any earlier payments made by the employer before applying the cap. However, in reaching this conclusion, the EAT expressed considerable sympathy with CIC. In paying the original compensatory award, CIC had complied with what it perceived to be its duty. Had it foreseen the possibility that the tribunal would increase the award at the second remedies hearing, it would probably have declined to make any payment until the compensatory order was final. Instead, it ended up owing £74,200 plus £46,153.55 instead of just £74,200.

Additionally, the EAT upheld the employment tribunal’s decision not to reconsider its refusal to award re-engagement after the second remedies hearing on the basis that such an order was impracticable because of Mrs Dafiaghor-Olomu’s attitude towards which jobs were suitable for her. It also dismissed a cross appeal in which CIC argued that the employment tribunal had not been entitled to increase the compensatory award at the second remedies hearing.

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Constructive Dismissal: Fundamental breach possible even where employer’s actions do not suggest intention to end employment relationship

In Singh v Metroline West Ltd [2022] EAT 80 the EAT has held that, in a constructive dismissal claim, a fundamental breach of contract can be established even where the employer’s actions do not indicate an intention to end the employment relationship.

Mr Singh was invited to a disciplinary hearing by Metroline West Ltd. The next day, Mr Singh was signed off sick by his doctor. While absent, he was examined by occupational health who did not suggest his sickness was not genuine. However, Metroline believed that Mr Singh was trying to avoid the disciplinary hearing. It therefore paid him statutory sick pay only, instead of company sick pay. Mr Singh brought a claim for constructive dismissal, alleging, among other things, that the failure to pay him company sick pay was a fundamental breach of contract.

The employment tribunal found that Metroline had contractual power to suspend Mr Singh without pay if it thought his absence was not genuine, but this power had not been exercised. Separately, Mr Singh’s contract allowed company sick pay to be withheld where, after investigation, absence was found not to be genuine. There was no investigation in this case and no other relevant contractual grounds on which company sick pay could be withheld. There was therefore a breach of contract. However, the tribunal found the breach was not fundamental. By withholding pay, Metroline had not indicated an intention not to be bound by the employment relationship; rather, its aim in withholding pay was to encourage Mr Singh’s participation in a disciplinary process integral to that relationship.

However, the EAT upheld Mr Singh’s appeal on this issue. It was an error of law for the tribunal to adopt the approach that, for the breach of contract to be fundamental, there must have been an intention by the employer not to be bound by the contract in a manner that meant that it no longer wished to continue with the employment relationship. What is required is that the employer demonstrates an intention to no longer comply with the terms of the contract that is so serious that it goes to the root of the contract. In this case, there was a deliberate decision to withhold pay to which Mr Singh was entitled, resulting in a significant reduction in earnings, in circumstances where there were other contractual provisions which would have allowed Metroline to deal with suspicions about his absence. This was a fundamental breach.

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Dismissal: ACAS code applied to discriminatory sham redundancy dismissal

In Rentplus UK Ltd v  Coulson [2022] EAT 81 the EAT has held that the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures (ACAS Code) applied to a discriminatory dismissal purportedly by reason of redundancy. The tribunal had not erred in awarding the maximum 25% uplift available for failure to follow the ACAS Code.

The employer’s ground of appeal that the ACAS Code could not apply where their reason for dismissal was redundancy and the reason found by the tribunal was sex discrimination failed. This was because the tribunal had rejected redundancy as the reason for the dismissal and the upholding of the sex discrimination claim did not mean that it was the only reason for the dismissal. The EAT considered it was implicit in the tribunal’s reasoning that the claimant was in a “disciplinary situation” to which the ACAS Code applied, this being that she was dismissed due to dissatisfaction with her personally and/or her performance, which was tainted by sex discrimination, and a fair capability or disciplinary procedure should therefore have applied.

It was clear that the tribunal had concluded the dismissal process was a sham and there had been a total failure to comply with the ACAS Code. The breach was referred to as “egregious” and so was beyond unreasonable. While, generally, a tribunal should identify the employer’s failings for which an uplift is being made by reference to the relevant part of the ACAS Code which the employer is said to be in breach of, in this case the tribunal had concluded that the employer had acted in bad faith such that there was a total failure to apply any of the protections provided for by the ACAS Code. In these circumstances, there was no error of law in the award of an uplift of 25%.

The EAT provided guidance in the form of questions that tribunals considering an ACAS uplift should apply:

  • Is the claim one which raises a matter to which the ACAS Code applies?
  • Has there been a failure to comply with the ACAS Code in relation to that matter?
  • Was the failure to comply with the ACAS Code unreasonable?
  • Is it just and equitable to award an uplift because of the failure to comply with the ACAS Code and, if so, by what percentage, up to 25%?

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Injunctive Relief: Interim enforcement of non-compete clauses

In Planon Ltd v Gilligan [2022] EWCA Civ 642 the Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal from the High Court’s refusal to grant an interim injunction to enforce a non-compete clause.

The High Court had held that the delay between the initial exchanges of correspondence between the parties and the application being heard was not the sort of delay that would disqualify the employer from interim injunctive relief. However, the employer’s prospects of success at trial in enforcing the non-compete clause were not that good, the critical point being the non-compete clause was likely to prevent the employee from being able to work in his field for 12 months. Damages would not, or might not, be an adequate remedy for either the employer or employee in this case.

While the Court of Appeal dismissed the employer’s appeal, its reasoning differed from that of the High Court. It held that the High Court had not taken the correct approach when considering whether the non-compete clause was reasonable. However, in view of the delay by the time the matter came before it, the court did not consider it appropriate to express a preliminary view about the enforceability of the clause.

The court considered the effect of delay in the case. There was a divergence of opinion between Elisabeth Laing LJ and Bean LJ, with Nugee LJ expressing no view, on the effect of the delay between the facts becoming known to the employer and the High Court hearing. Elisabeth Laing LJ considered that the judge had reached a decision open to him on the facts while Bean LJ considered that the judge would have been entitled to refuse an injunction on the ground of delay. The court noted that there was no rule of law to the effect that damages would be an adequate remedy for the employee (if it was found that at trial that a restrictive covenant is unenforceable). Bean LJ suggested that, except in cases of very wealthy defendants, or where a claimant employer is offering paid garden leave for the whole period of the restraint, it was unrealistic to argue that damages would be an adequate remedy.

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Without Prejudice: Without prejudice letter inadmissible despite exaggerated allegations

In Swiss Re Corporate Solutions Ltd v Sommer [2022] EAT 78 the EAT has held that an employment judge erred when holding that a without prejudice letter could be admitted into evidence under the “unambiguous impropriety” exception to the without prejudice rule in proceedings brought by an employee against her former employer. The without prejudice rule prevents statements made (whether in writing or orally) in a genuine attempt to settle an existing dispute from being put before the court as evidence of admissions against the interest of the party that made them.

The letter referred to the employee’s actions in having copied three emails to her personal email address when sending them to her employer in pursuit of a grievance. The emails had contained personal data and matters confidential to the employer and its clients. Before offering to settle her complaints by way of termination of her employment and payment of compensation, the letter alleged that the employee’s actions breached the confidentiality obligations in her employment contract, were a criminal offence under the Data Protection Act 2018 and meant that she had acted, or might have acted, without integrity in breach of Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) rules. This could result in summary dismissal, criminal convictions, fines and FCA findings which could make it difficult for her to work again in the regulated sector.

In holding that the unambiguous impropriety exception applied, the employment judge found that there had been no basis at all for the employer’s assertion that the employee’s actions amounted to serious misconduct and that the severity of what she had done had been grossly exaggerated in order to put pressure on her to accept the termination of her employment.

The EAT held that the employment judge had erred in finding there was no basis at all for the allegations of serious misconduct. It considered that the high threshold for unambiguous impropriety could be met in circumstances in which a party made exaggerated allegations although it was unaware of any decided case on this point. However, exaggeration would not usually pass the threshold without findings as to the guilty party’s state of mind. The employment judge did not make such findings, and the EAT doubted that this could have validly been done at a preliminary hearing without oral evidence. The only possible outcome in this case was that the without prejudice letter was inadmissible in evidence.

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Further Information:

If you would like any additional information, please contact Anne-Marie Pavitt or Sophie Banks on: hello@dixcartuk.com

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The data contained within this document is for general information only. No responsibility can be accepted for inaccuracies. Readers are also advised that the law and practice may change from time to time. This document is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute accounting, legal or tax advice. Professional advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this document.

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